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1 Introduction 
“In the aftermath of elections in 2007, at least 1,200 people died after politicians whipped up 
ethnic tensions that triggered violence on an unprecedented scale” (Allen 2012). The  tension 
within Kenya resulted in civil war along ethnic lines, and is one of several examples where 
ethnic dimensions play a role in the onset of civil conflict. In studies of civil conflict onset, 
ethnicity has an important function for two reasons; first ethnic groups make collective action 
easier to achieve. Secondly they are uniquely visible, and therefore more constraining 
(Kalyvas 2008: 1044). Most wars in developing countries have an ethnic dimension, based on 
the fact that there are conflict along ethnic lines (Murshed and Gates, 2005: 122; Buhaug, 
2006: 697). 
 
When Collier and Hoeffler (2004) wrote their hotly debated article “Greed and Grievance in 
Civil war”1, they tested opportunity and grievance mechanisms for civil war onset.2 
Constructing their two separate models, they operationalized their measure for ethnicity, 
ethnic fractionalization, as an indicator of grievance. Ethnic fractionalization was also argued 
to be and indicator for grievance by Fearon and Laitin (2003). The aim and main contribution 
of this thesis is to answer: Through what mechanism
3
 ethnic fractionalization work as an 
indicator for civil conflict onset? Is it right to use ethnic fractionalization as an indicator for 
grievance, as done by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon and Laitin(2003) when 
modeling civil war onset or is there other alternatives? According to Ellingsen (2011: 100) the 
literature on civil war onset have a tendency to treat ethnic factors as a grievance mechanism, 
but “it is possible that the ethnic composition of a country actually is more related to 
feasibility and opportunity factors than what is argued”. Whether ethnic fractionalization is an 
indicator of grievance or opportunity for civil war onset has not yet been investigated by 
researchers, it has been operationalized as a measure for grievance, but might as well be an 
indicator in itself. 
 
In their article Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and to some extent Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
conceptualized civil war as a result of either opportunity or grievance, all of them finding that 
                                                          
1
 This article has recieved some criticism, and their model has in later years been developed (Collier, Hoeffler 
and Rohner 2009).   
2
 Whether the reason for civil war onset is opportunity or grievance is not the main focus in this thesis. 
3
 With mechanism is meant the three links between ethnicity, and civil war onset: grievance, opportunity and 
identity.  
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opportunity mechanisms best can explain civil war onset. By limiting civil war to be a result 
of either grievance of opportunity, other significant mechanisms might not be taken into 
account when making a causal model for civil war onset. This would be the case if ethnic 
fractionalization is an indicator for civil war onset in itself. An implication of this is that the 
model of civil war must be widened, also including identity as a mechanism for civil war. 
With starting point in the conceptualization of civil war as a result of either mechanism , and 
the link between ethnicity and civil conflict establish a theoretical framework. 
 
In order to answer the research question three mutually exclusive hypotheses are presented. 
Introducing the arguments for the separate hypotheses, I first argued that ethnicity is an 
indicator for grievance. Second, I argue that it is an indicator for opportunity, and last that it is 
an indicator in itself. These arguments are presented based on a theoretical framework that is 
presented earlier in Chapter 2 where I first establish the central concepts civil conflict and 
ethnicity are defined. Following this, the underlying theory concerning the contemporary 
debate of whether civil war is a cause of grievance or opportunity is presented. Although the 
focus of this thesis is not whether civil war is a result of opportunity or grievance factors, an 
overview over the two directions is needed in order to understand how ethnicity can work as 
an indicator of either grievance or opportunity. After this is the connection between ethnicity 
and civil war is reviewed, separating between theoretical and empirical connections. A 
theoretical connection is presented based the school of primordialism, instrumentalism and 
constructivism. The empirical connection summarizes the empirical findings on the link 
between ethnicity and civil war in earlier research. Following this the three theoretical 
arguments mentioned over are presented leading up to the hypotheses. In all, three hypotheses 
are presented: H1: Ethnic fractionalization is an indicator of opportunity, H2: Ethnic 
fractionalization is an indicator of grievance, and H3: Ethnic fractionalization is an indicator 
in itself.  
 
After building the theoretical framework the research design is demonstrated. First, in chapter 
3 the second contribution to the research field is presented, an updated index of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF). This index is used to measure the level of ethnic 
fractionalization and is the most frequently used variable when looking at the relationship 
between ethnicity and civil war (Kalyvas 2008). The ELF-index gives the probability of two 
randomly drawn people in a country coming from different ethnolinguistic groups (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003). The old index have values from early 1990, the new index is interpolated 
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between the values of the old and new one between 1990 and 2011. Following, the different 
statistical methods that are used in the thesis are presented stating with logistic regression 
with time-series cross-sectional data, the principle for this method and its challenges is 
demonstrated. Thereafter, the statistical method used to answer the research question, 
exploratory factor analysis, is presented. Last in this Chapter 3 the variables are described, 
starting with the dependent variables civil war, and civil conflict onset. Thereafter the other 
variables that are used in the analysis are introduces. These are sorted into either variables that 
proxies the grievance conceptualizing of civil war, or opportunity. After presenting the 
different variables results from the empirical analysis and discussion of the results follows in 
Chapter 4.   
 
Based on the empirical analysis using logistic regressions it is established an empirical link 
between ethnicity and onset of civil conflict, this relationship is curvilinear taking the shape of 
an inverted-u. No significant relationship between ethnicity and civil war onset is found.
4
 
Following, results from two separate factor analyses are demonstrated, one based on the 
original interpolated ELF-index, the second taking into account the curvilinear relationship 
between ethnic fractionalization and civil war based on a recoded variable. Both factor 
analyses show that ethnicity is a mechanism of civil conflict onset in itself, confirming 
hypothesis H3. In other words, hypotheses H1 and H2 are rejected, concluding that ethnicity is 
a mechanism for civil conflict onset in itself due to the salience of identity.  
 
As a result of this ethnic fractionalization cannot be operationalized as a grievance indicator, 
as has been done by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon and Laitin (2003). Neither is it 
an opportunity indicator as indicated by Ellingsen (2011), it is a mechanism in itself. Future 
research must take into account the aspect of identity when constructing a causal model 
explaining civil conflict onset. Lastly, civil onset as a combination of grievance, opportunity, 
and identity, not see it as a result of an “either-or” term as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) do in 
their article. Given that ethnic fractionalization lead to civil conflict due to the salience of 
identity, it is argued that identity alone cannot explain onset, based on some logical faults in 
the primordial argument. Civil conflict onset must therefore be seen as a result of grievance, 
opportunity, and identity as argued by Gurr (2000), and Ellingsen (2000).  
  
                                                          
4
 Civil conflict and civil war is defined in the next chapter. 
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2 Theory 
First and foremost this part of the thesis will focus on establishing a link between different 
theoretical approaches, and ethnicity as an indicator of these in relation to civil conflict onset. 
In order to do this it is important to have an understanding of the central concepts civil 
conflict, civil war, and ethnicity. First the notions of civil conflict and civil war are 
established. Following this, ethnicity is defined. Thereafter the theoretical foundation for 
conceptualizing civil war as a result of grievance or opportunity is laid down. The connection 
between ethnicity and civil war is then presented, starting with the theoretical link as seen by 
primordialists, instrumentalists and constructivists, followed by the empirical link based on 
earlier research. Here different measures on ethnicity, in addition to the ELF-index are shortly 
presented, and results when using these measures. Based on the theoretical foundation 
ethnicity is argued to be an indicator of for civil conflict onset through either grievance, 
opportunity or an indicator  itself due to the salience of identity is presented. To each of these 
arguments a hypothesis is presented, in all there are three mutually exclusive hypotheses.  
 
2.1 Defining Civil Conflict 
In the research on civil war there are mainly two dominant definitions, where the main 
difference is the fatality threshold. Collier et al. (2003) define civil war as taking place when 
“an identifiable rebel organization challenges the government military and the resulting 
violence  results in more than 1,000 combat related deaths, with at  least 5 percent of the 
casualties on each side” (Collier et al. 2003: 54). Within the datasets generating with a 
threshold of 1000 battle related deaths there are some differences regarding coding rules. 
Some register war only if there is more than 1000 battle related deaths within a year
5
, others 
include the entire course of war.
6
  
 
The second level of threshold is 25 battle related deaths within a year. This threshold is much 
lower and is referred to as civil conflict.
7
 In this thesis there are two dependent variables, one 
based on the definition of civil war, the other one is based on the definition used by  
UCDP/PRIO
8
. They define an armed conflict as a “contested incompatibility that concern 
                                                          
5
 This is the coding rule applied for the dependent variable measuring war in this thesis.  
6
 See Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laition (2003), Sambanis (2004), and the Correlates of War 
(COW).  
7
 In the thesis the terms civil war and civil conflict is used interchangeably, this is also the case in the literature in 
the research field. In cases where it is important to note the difference it will be specified.   
8
 Harbom and Wallesteen (2012); Gleditsch et al. (2002) 
5 
 
government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties result in at 
least 25 battle related deaths in one year. Of these parties, at least one has to be the 
government state” (Themnér and Wallensteen 2012: 572).  
 
It is registered that over the last decades the nature of civil war has changed. Throughout the 
1990s the number of civilian casualties reached 90 percent or more of the total number of 
deaths, a high proportion of these are children and women (Chesterman 2001: 2). But civil 
war is not only destructive in that a number of people that are killed’, other parts of society 
are also affected, like the economy, infrastructure and general development. An additional 
effect can also be the spread of insecurity throughout the region, which would increase the 
risk of civil war in neighboring countries. A war-thorn country is also a country where 
opportunities for human trafficking and terrorism are more likely and society as a whole is 
ruined. But, despite the grave consequences of it, civil war still occurs, often along ethnic 
lines (Murshed and Gates 2005).  
 
2.2 Defining Ethnicity 
“Ethnicity is like family or marriage; everybody knows what it means but nobody  can define 
it” (Smith, quoted in Alonso 1994: 379). There are innumerable definitions of ethnicity, 
which demonstrates that it is a difficult notion to get a clear grasp of (Horowitz 2000). 
According to Fenton (2010: 3) ethnicity is “something ‘out there’ which correspond to what 
observers call ‘ethnicity’”. Ethnicity as a term goes back to the Greek word “ethnos” and it 
was used to describe a kinship group linked together by bonds of blood (Wolff 2006). 
Ethnicity is based on a belief in a common heritage, which usually brings with it traits that are 
held to be innate (Horowitz 2000). These features are also found in the German national 
romantic conception of a state, often referred to as das Volk. The German understanding of a 
state emphasize on a common language, culture, and history, features that can be seen as 
innate. Religion has in later years also been regarded as an important feature (Ellingsen 2000). 
 
Based on the view of ethnicity as “something ‘out there’”, and the link to kinship, common 
heritage, language, culture and also religion an ethnic group is in this thesis defined as a group 
made up by individuals who share common traits such as language, religion or race, a belief 
in a common heritage, and an association with a given territory (Toft 2002: 87). The salience 
of ethnic identity becomes recognized when ethnic identity has a collective consequence for a 
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group in its relation to states and other ethnic groups. In other words, ethnicity is likely to be 
highly significant when it is a basis for people’s security, material well-being, status, or access 
to political power (Gurr 2000).  
 
2.3 Grievance and Opportunity in Civil Conflict 
As mentioned in the introduction the contemporary debate on whether civil war is a result of 
opportunity or grievance factors was introduces when Collier and Hoeffler (2004) presented 
their much debated article “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”. In the article they present two 
models, one includes opportunity factors, and the other one includes grievance factors. The 
results from their analysis show that the opportunity model gives a better explanation for the 
occurrence of civil war compared to grievance related factors. Fearon and Laitin (2003) also 
use a similar distinction, and do also conclude that opportunity structures best explain civil 
war onset. Both articles use ethnic fractionalization as a measure on ethnicity, and use it in 
their analysis as an indicator of grievance. The aim of this thesis is to examine through what 
mechanism
9
 ethnic fractionalization work as an indicator for civil conflict onset?. Below the 
underlying theory of grievance and opportunity is presented. This is important because it 
demonstrates the conceptualizing of civil war as a result of either grievance or opportunity 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), and give a basis before relating ethnicity 
to either of the concepts later in this chapter.  
 
2.3.1 Grievance and Relative Deprivation 
As mentioned Collier and Hoeffler (2004) found little support for grievance as an explanatory 
factor for civil war onset in their analysis. However there is no consensus among scholars that 
grievance does not lead to rebellion and civil war (Collier 2007). Grievance is a result of 
deprivation in an individual sense, which in turn establishes itself collectively. It is linked to 
political and material deprivation, and is often aggregated within specific homogeneous 
group, ethnic groups being one example of such a group. In other words it is the individual 
penury that is the starting point for collective mobilization (Regan and Norton 2005: 323). 
One way of explaining this individual grievance is by applying the relative deprivation theory 
onto the development of frustration and grievance. 
 
                                                          
9
 With mechanism is meant the three links between ethnicity, and civil war onset: grievance, opportunity and 
identity.  
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Relative deprivation was first used in a systematic way in the 1940s by Stouffer et al. (1949) 
who studied of the American Soldier. The aim of the study was to explain the feelings of an 
individual who did not get the conditions or status that he himself thought he was entitled to. 
The basic thought is that “persons may feel that they are deprived of some desired state or 
thing, in comparison with some standard, or with the real or imagined condition of other 
people” (Williams 1975: 355). The deprived actor school assumes that anger is a result of 
deprivation, and that it has a direct effect on the likelihood that a person will participate in 
violent action. One of the earliest contributions in newer time is Davies (1962), he made a 
substantial contribution in explaining the link between depression and violence. He argues 
that it is the “dissatisfied state of mind rather than tangible previous of ’adequate’ or 
‘inadequate’ supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produces the revolution” (Davies 
1962: 6).  
 
Gurr (1970) also had a significant influence on the theory of relative deprivation with the 
book Why Men Rebel. He states that the extent, and intensity of the deprivation is the basis for 
potential collective violence. The potential chain is “first the development of discontent, 
second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action 
against political objects and actors” (Gurr 1970: 12f). 
 
Graham and Gurr (1969) argue that it is the progressive form for deprivation that is the most 
dangerous one.
10
 As shown in Figure 1 the distance between expectations and capabilities are 
the same in the beginning, both are increasing, but the capabilities cannot keep up with the 
expectations. The difference between the two is referred to as relative deprivation. Relative 
deprivation can be seen as a subjective characteristic that occur when a person does not get 
what he thinks he has the right to, the perception of being deprived of something you feel you 
are entitled to (Ellingsen 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Other forms of relative deprivation are decremental deprivation, aspirational deprivation and persisting 
deprivation.  
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Figure 1. Progressive deprivation 
 
Source: Graham and Gurr (1969)
11
 
It is also another approach that links grievances to the onset of civil conflict, inequality. 
Structural inequality within a state has been linked to several incidences of political violence, 
and revolutionary movement in the developing world. The inequality generates a sense of 
frustration for those that are not included (Regan and Norton 2005: 320). The distinction 
between relative deprivation and inequality may seem unimportant at first, but it is a 
difference that is worth noticing. Relative deprivation rests upon a set of psychological 
processes, and frustration is based on a gap between a person’s individual expectations, and 
reality. Inequality on the other hand is based on individual expectations compared to others 
within society (Gurr 1970, Regan and Norton 2005). In literature on civil war onset. 
inequality between groups is referred to as horizontal inequality (Østby 2008). Common for 
both relative deprivation and inequality is that they can be used to argue that ethnicity 
function as a mechanism for civil war onset through grievance, this is done later. 
 
2.3.2 Opportunity and Rational Actor 
Opportunity as a part of the “greed” versus grievance debate has its roots in economic theory. 
Rebellion is a result of the circumstances, and the opportunities that make it possible. Arguing 
that civil war is a result of opportunity is developed from the rational actor theory. Rational 
actor theory in research on civil war onset was taken into use as a reaction to the grievance-
based explanations that dominated during the 1960s (Jacoby 2008: 124). The theory argues 
that participation in protest groups, rebellion and social movements is not a result of 
psychological states or traits, but a result of “rational decision processes whereby people 
                                                          
11
 Relative Deprivation (RD).  
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weight the cost benefits of participation” (Klandermans 1984: 583). Olson (1965) argues that 
individuals do not participate in collective action based on grievance, but based on the 
possible gain from participation. It is the possible gain that must be seen as the trigger factor 
(Ellingsen 2000). The rational individual can only be stimulated to participate based on a 
“separate and ‘selective’ incentive” (Olson 1965: 51, emphasize his). In order to decide 
whether or not to participate each individual do a cost-benefit analysis. There must be a 
personal gain for a person to take part in the group. If the cost is too high compared to the 
benefit, the rational actor will not participate (Jacoby 2008: 126). The incentive must be 
selective, those who participate in a given group or organization, and works for the groups 
interests must be treated differently compared to those that do not participate (Olson 1965: 
51). In other words the personal benefit can only be given to an individual if a person 
participates in the war; if people can get the benefit anyway it will be much more rational to 
be a free-rider.  
A rational individual who does not like the cost (loss of life, limb or family members), and in 
the absence of negative incentives, would be better off not to participate, whether or not other 
individuals do. Those who ultimately engage in revolutionary action do so on the basis of 
rational (cost-benefits) analysis. Individuals engage in revolutionary activity because they 
derive some personal gain (Conteh-Morgan 2004: 96, emphasize his). 
At the start of the greed versus grievance debate, Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) argued that rebellion was driven by greed, and the opportunity for personal 
benefits when participation. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) only focus on economic opportunity 
in their article. A similar grasp is done by Fearon and Laitin (2003), by removing the 
materialist factors from grievance, the materialist factor is the main theoretical argument for 
the opportunity factor. It is the opportunity to pursue material good that is the focus in the 
opportunity argument. 
 
For rebel organizations victory in civil war is rare and not seen as an expected outcome for a 
rational actor. A rational actor will therefore not participate in rebellion based on the reward 
the person gets when they win the war it is the possibility of personal gains during the war 
that intrigues the individual to participate (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Sambanis (2005) model civil war as an industry that produces rewards for those 
who participate in it. The explanation of civil war as a result of greed or feasibility assumes 
that rebels act in a pursuit of material gain based on self-interests, this is an argument that has 
10 
 
its roots in the rational actor theory (Regan and Norton 2005). It is only occasionally that 
rebel groups can be sustained both financially and military, based on this opportunity for 
personal gain is a significant factor. The financing of a rebellion is often associated with the 
availability of natural resources (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009: 88). The opportunity to loot 
natural resources gives rebel groups access to wealth, and a desire for wealth is motivated by 
some form of greed (De Soysa 2002: 396).  
 
Collier, as one of the most influential researchers arguing for opportunity as a cause of war 
criticized the grievance explanation of civil war in several ways. According to Collier (2007: 
198) the popular assumption that grievance is a cause of war has been shaped by the 
dissertation that a conflict in itself generates. Grievance is neither a cause of conflict, nor is it 
an unintentional by-product of it. Dismissing the grievance approach is done based on a 
believe that apparent grievance and desire for power is found more or less in all types of 
societies, and that it is the opportunity of feasibility of rebellion that distinguished the 
societies experiencing civil war from those that do not (Collier 2007). This demonstrates the 
“either-or” perspective that is used by Coller and Hoeffler (2004). But as mentioned before 
this is just a backdrop for the main focus in this thesis. It is not the debate of whether it is 
grievance or opportunity that can explain civil war onset that is center of the thesis, but 
through what mechanism for civil war onset that ethnicity functions as an indicator. In the 
following section I look closer at the connection between ethnicity, and civil war, both 
theoretically and empirically.  
 
2.4 Connections between Ethnicity and Civil Conflict 
The presentation of grievance and opportunity above is only linked to civil war onset, and not 
ethnicity In order to understand the relevance of the research question: Through what 
mechanism does ethnic fractionalization work as an indicator for civil conflict onset?, a 
connection between ethnicity and civil war  must be demonstrated, this is done below. Fist, a 
theoretical relationship between ethnicity and civil war is presented through the three 
dominating perspectives: primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. Following, the 
empirical relationship between ethnicity and civil war is put forward based on a literary 
review on earlier research on this link. It is not only ethnic fractionalization that is used as a 
measure for ethnicity when researching the connection between ethnicity and civil war, a brief 
11 
 
presentation over other measurer of ethnicity, and empirical finding related to these are 
shortly presented.
12
 But first, the theoretical link between ethnicity and civil war is presented.  
 
2.4.1 The Theoretical Connection between Ethnicity and Civil Conflict 
There are basically three different perspectives to understand the underlying mechanisms that 
drive ethnic groups to mobilize for violence: primordialism, instrumentalism, and 
constructivism. The primordialists see the characteristics of a group to be fixed. Each 
individual are born into their ethnic identity. Ethnic characteristics cannot change, and 
therefore they remain the same over time (Fenton 2010). A persons’ ethnic identity is deeply 
integrated in human experience and history, and it cannot be rejected that it exists, 
subjectively or objectively. It must therefore be seen as a part of life in the relationship 
between groups and individuals (Wolff 2006: 33). Following the primordialist view on 
ethnicity the common features of speech, custom, history, and so on, must have an ineffable, 
and at time coerciveness in, and of themselves. A shared ethnic identity can become 
overpowering (Geertz 1973: 259). According to primoardialist civil war is a result of ethnic 
differences, and not a result of other factors in society, like economic or political differences 
(Blimes 2006: 537; Østby 2011: 28). According to Vanhanen (1999) civil conflict onset in 
ethnically divided societies is a result of the assumption that ethnic nepotism is part of human 
nature. The primordial view on ethnicity has been criticized for not taking into consideration 
that ethnic groups change over time. Further, they fail to explain why conflict between ethnic 
groups only erupts in some countries, and not in others (Blimes 2006).  
The instrumentalists, on the other hand, criticize primordialists for simplifying the explanation 
of “ancient hatred“ as a cause of civil war, claiming that they overlooks deeper problems that 
are the true reasons for conflict (Blimes 2006). Instrumentalists hold the position that 
ethnicity is only a tool that a group or an individual uses in order to achieve a goal (Blimes 
2006: 537; Østby 2011: 29). “Ethnicicty is […] a resource in the hands of leaders to mobilize 
and organize followers in the pursuit of other interests, such as physical security, economic 
gain, or political power” (Wolff 2006: 33). In other words, ethnicity is in itself not the source 
for violent conflict. It becomes prone to war when leaders demonstrate that it is tied to a 
history of conflict, acute social uncertainty, and fear of what the future might bring, only then 
                                                          
12
 By doing this I also touch upon a large debate in the research on civil war onset, how to measure ethnicity, due 
to the focus of the thesis and limitations to the length of the paper I will not go deeper into this debate. See 
Cederman and Girardin (2007), Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin (2007), and Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2009) for 
further information on the debate. 
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is it that ethnicity emerge as a major fault line along social fractures (Lake and Rothchild 
1998: 7). This means that ethnic identity can be used as a mobilization factor for collective 
violence by leaders, but not as a conflict factor in itself as the primordialists hold (Nordås 
2012).  
 
The third perspective on the connection between ethnicity and violence is constructivism. 
This school tries to bridge the primordialist and instrumentalist views. The debate linked to 
constructivism dominated in the 1980s and 1990s (Kanbur, Rajaram and Varshney 2011: 
148). Due to its position as a bridge constructivism sees ethnicity as a result of common 
tangible features. Constructivists believe that ethnicity is neither fixed, nor is it completely 
open for change. Ethnicity is partly inherited and partly chosen (Østby 2011: 28ff). At birth 
several identity categories are given to each individual, only some of them being relevant at 
different times in life. The significance of ethnic identity may vary. Further, the significance 
and content of ethnic group identity can and do change over time, and usually it is a response 
to a change in the groups’ political and social environment (Gurr 2000: 4; Wolff 2006: 34). In 
today’s literature on civil war it is the constructivist that in large parts dominates. Table 1 
presents a short overview over the three different perspectives introduced above.  
 
Table 1. Three theoretical perspectives on ethnicity and civil war 
Primordialists Each individual are born into their ethnic identity. 
Ethnic identity is fixed. 
Instrumentalists Ethnicity is a tool that a group or an individual uses 
in order to achieve a goal, often associated with 
political leaders. 
Constructivists Ethnicity is neither fixed, nor is it completely open 
for change. Ethnicity is partly inherited and partly 
chosen.   
Source: Fenton (2010), Østby (2011) 
 
2.4.2 The Empirical Connection between Ethnicity and Civil Conflict  
Looking at the empirical link between ethnicity and civil war the main question asked 
regarding ethnicity on a macro-level is whether or not ethnicity is significant for the 
likelihood of civil war onset or not (Kalycas 2008). Following is a review of the results when 
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researching the connection between ethnicity and civil conflict. First, the research that has 
used ethnic fractionalization as a measure for ethnicity are presented, the same measure used 
in this thesis. Following, other measures on ethnicity and belonging results are presented 
briefly.  
 
As mentioned Coller and Hoeffler (2004), and to some extent Fearon and Laitin (2003), 
operationalize civil war as either explained by opportunity or grievance, and ethnic 
fractionalization is used as an indicator for grievance. Testing the relationship between 
ethnicity and civil war onset neither of them finds a significant relationship. In other words 
there is according to them no connection between the level of fractionalization within a 
country and the risk of civil war onset. Contrary to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon 
and Laitin (2003), Sambanis (2001) found that an increasing level of ethnic fractionalization 
is significantly and positively correlated with the likelihood of civil war onset. Distinguishing 
between protest, rebellion, and civil war, Regan and Norton (2005) demonstrated that ethnic 
fractionalization is positively and significantly associated with rebellion and civil war, but not 
protest. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) also found a link between ethnicity and civil war in low 
intensity wars,civil conflict, but contrary to Regan and Norton (2005) they found no 
relationship between the two in full-scale civil war. Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009) 
combine a measure of ethnic fractionalization and religious fractionalization, and called it 
social fractionalization. They found that social fractionalization increases the risk of civil war 
onset significantly. This is contrary to results from earlier analyses done by Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) where they found no significant relationship between ethnic- or religious 
fractionalization and civil war onset. As a robust check of their analysis Coller, Hoeffler, and 
Rohner (2009) used civil conflict onset as the dependent varibale, doing so they found social 
fractionalization to be positively and significantly associated with the risk of civil conflict 
onset. Buhaug (2006) also a threshold of 25 battle related deaths and found that an increase in 
ethnic fractionalization increases the risk of civil conflict onset. Common for the results 
presented over is that they are all based on a version of the ELF-index. The results are 
inconclusive, but there is an overweight of researches who found ethnic fractionalization to 
have a significant indicator for civil war, and conflict onset. 
 
Of the research mentioned above it is only Coller and Hoeffler (2004), and in part Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) that proxy’s ethnic fractionalization as an indicator for grievance. Cederman, 
Wimmer, and Min (2009) also link ethnicity to grievance, but do not use ethnic 
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fractionalization as a measure for ethnicity. Contrary to the research presented, they argue that 
highly diverse societies are not more prone to conflict than other countries, but that ethnicity 
and civil war is linked together due to different ethnopolitical configurations. Armed rebellion 
is much more likely if a large proportion of the population is excluded based on their ethnic 
identity. Violence is also more likely if a large number of competing elites share power in a 
state that is segmented. It is grievance as a result of inequality that leads to civil war. In order 
to test their argument Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2009) have developed a dataset that 
“identifies all politically relevant ethnic categories around the world and measure access to 
executive-level state power for members of the ethnic categories in all year from 1945–2005” 
(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2009: 325), the dataset is called Ethnic Power Relations 
(EPR). The results of their analysis show that, based on an underlying structural factors, the 
onset of civil war is significantly correlated with the share of the population that are excluded 
on the basis of their ethnic background (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2009; 2010).   
 
Minorities at Risk (MAR) is another dataset looks at ethnic groups in relation to other ethnic 
groups. It is based on the assumption that minority ethnic groups are discriminated, which in 
turn results in grievance. It documents that status of ethnic and religious minority groups in all 
countries in the world after 1946. Using the data in research indicate that ethnonationalists 
groups are more likely than other groups to adapt strategies of rebellion (Gurr 2000: 232).  
 
Like Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2009), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue that 
highly diverse countries not are more prone to conflict than other countries. Instead Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol (2005) argues that countries that are polarized have a higher likelihood of 
civil war onset. Measuring ethnicity by using an index of ethnic polarization, often called the 
RQ-index
13
, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) found that ethnic polarization has a positive 
effect on the likelihood of civil war onset. In other words countries that are homogenous or 
heterogeneous have a lover likelihood for civil war onset than polarized counties. That the 
level of ethnic polarization matters for the probability of civil conflict onset, demonstrates that 
the size of the ethnic group compared to one another also matter. This is also found by 
Ellingsen (2000). 
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 Inspired by the Esteban and Ray (1994) 
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Using a different variety of categories Ellingsen (2000) found that in countries where the 
largest ethnic group constitutes less than 80 percent of the total population, the risk of civil 
war onset is 1.3 times higher than in societies where the largest ethnic group constitutes over 
80 percent of the population.
14
 Further, the analysis give that in countries where the second 
largest ethnic group makes up 5 –20 percent of the population, the likelihood of civil war 
onset is higher than in countries where the second largest group is under 5 percent and, over 
20 percent. Using a very similar measure on ethnicity as Ellingsen (2000), Hegre et al. (2001) 
found that ethnic heterogeneity increases the probability of civil war. The likelihood of onset 
is twice as high in countries where the largest ethnic group makes up only half of the 
population compared to countries where it constitutes more than 95 percent of the population. 
Finding that the level of polarization have an effect on the likelihood of civil war onset, and 
that the size of the ethnic group matter Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), and Ellingsen 
(2000) implicate that ethnicity is linked to opportunity, this will be discussed later.  
 
Above the empirical connection between ethnicity and civil war has been reviewed. Later in 
in the thesis the relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict is tested empirically tested 
once again mainly to test the new ELF-index, but also to test for a curvilinear relationship 
between ethnicity and civil conflict onset. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), and Ellingsen 
(2000) both found it to be less violence in homogenous and heterogeneous (fractionalized) 
countries. The best way to control for this is when using ethnic fractionalization as a measure 
for ethnicity is to control for a curvilinear relationship. Since the ELF-index only is a 
secondary contribution, and the empirical relationship between ethnicity and civil war is a 
minor part of the theses, hypotheses are not presented. Testing the empirical relationship 
between ethnicity and civil conflict helpful in order to demonstrate why it is important to look 
closer at ethnicity as an indicator for civil war onset, and what mechanism it works through. 
In the following chapter ethnicity as an indicator of either grievance, opportunity or identity is 
presented, resulting in three mutually exclusive hypotheses.  
 
2.5 Three Explanations of the link between Ethnicity and Civil Conflict 
Above the theoretical foundation for opportunity and grievance was presented. As pointed out 
by Ellingsen (2011) literature today has a tendency to look at ethnicity as a grievance 
indicator for civil war, but it can also be seen as an indicator for opportunity. In the following 
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 Two dependent variables war used, both gave the same results. Civil war onset is for the period 1946-1992, 
civil conflict onset for the period 1989-1992.  
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I argue that ethnicity can be seen as an indicator of grievance, opportunity or identity. Theory 
presented earlier in the chapter will be applied in order to build up separate arguments. Three 
separate hypotheses are presented, all of them being mutually exclusive. I start by arguing that 
ethnicity is an indicator for grievance, this is in line with Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and 
Fearon and Laitins’ (2003) way of operationalizing ethnic fractionalization. Following this, I 
argue that ethnicity is an indicator of opportunity as indicated by Ellingsen (2011). Last I 
argue that ethnic identity is an indicator for civil war onset in itself, this is based on the 
primordialist conception of ethnicity, and the salience of territory for an ethnic group. 
 
2.3.2 The Link between Ethnicity, Grievance, and Civil Conflict 
In their attempt to make a clear distinction between proxies for opportunity and grievance 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) included ethnic fractionalization as an indicator for grievance. 
Following I argue that ethnicity can be seen as an indicator of grievance   
 
Toft (2002: 84) argues that the link between ethnicity and grievance is founded in an 
individual’s ethnic identity, along with a common group identity. Ethnicity is a fundamental 
factor in people’s identity, and being a fundamental factor it is adequate in the process of 
grievance based mobilization (Ellingsen 2000).  According to Murshed and Gates (2005: 122) 
it is not sufficient to only have a common identity, a shared grievance must also be present. 
Based on the relative deprivation theory, grievance is triggered by the expectations compared 
to the actual conditions. Relative deprivation can be linked to ethnicity through a common 
feeling of deprivation. It is the feeling of frustration that results in conflict and war, if the 
feeling of frustration occurs along ethnic lines ethnicity is an indicator for grievance 
 
Approaching grievance through inequality, and discrimination it can also be argued that 
ethnicity is an grievance indicator. Here the focus is inequality between groups, also called 
horizontal inequalities (Østby 2008). Political discrimination is an example of inequality that 
results in grievances, and is helpful when explaining the link between ethnicity, grievance, 
and civil war. Ethnic groups that are politically discriminated, have a higher likelihood of 
turning to violent actions than ethnic groups that are not politically discriminated (Cederman, 
Wimmer, and Min 2009, 2010). In for example sub Saharan Africa, and South-, and Southeast 
Asia, ethnically based political parties are common. Access to political benefits is often 
structured along the same ethnic lines as the politics in the same countries (Fearon 2006).  The 
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inequality between ethnic groups is linked to grievance, and “the relation between inequality 
and rebellion is indeed a close one” (Sen 1973: 1).  
 
From an instrumentalist perspective on ethnicity can also be used when explaining the link 
between frustration, ethnicity, and civil war onset. Regan and Norton (2005) do this when 
they argue that rebel leaders use the common grievance within an ethnic group in order to 
mobilize them to participate in civil conflict onset. The rebel leaders mobilize ethnic groups in 
order to secure their own personal gain, rebel leaders can be seen as driven by opportunity 
whereas the larger ethnic group is driven by frustration. Based on the established link between 
ethnicity, grievance, and civil war onset demonstrated through deprived actor theory, 
horizontal inequalities, and an instrumentalist view on ethnicity, the first hypothesis in the 
thesis is presented:  
 H1: Ethnicity is an indicator of grievance. 
 
2.3.4 The Link between Ethnicity, Opportunity, and Civil Conflict 
As the argument over show, ethnicity might very well be an indicator of grievance in line with 
the assumption done by Collier and Hoeffler (2004). Still arguing within the “useful 
conceptual distinction” (Collier 1999: 1) of grievance and opportunity, I argue that ethnicity 
also can be used as an indicator of opportunity.   
 
The opportunity approach to civil war view ethnic groups as an extreme form of interest 
group where members have a common preference in all types of public politics. Ethnic groups 
are political coalitions that are present in order to take care of its members (or leader’s) 
economic interests (Fearon 2006: 861f). Toft (2002: 85) concludes that ethnic groups must be 
seen as rational actors, they calculate, and maximize their utility before entering or initiating a 
civil war. In order to secure the survival of an ethnic group, resources and wealth is important, 
and ethnic groups can be seen as rational actors rebelling when they have the opportunity to 
secure or get access to resources and wealth. This is in line with Collier and Hoeffler (2004), 
and Fearon and Laitin (2003) that have a view on opportunity based on economical and 
material gains, greed are the motive for rebellion.  
Ethnic groups can be seen in light of the rational actor theory. Ethnic groups and individuals 
belonging to the group calculate their collective interest before entering or starting a conflict 
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(Fenton 2010: 74). Their collective interest can have roots in securing financial powers 
through looting natural resources, or defending natural resources within the ethnic groups’ 
territory (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009).  When there is competition about scarce resources, 
ethnic identity become more important. In line with the rational actor theory a cost-benefit 
analysis is performed, and if the benefit is perceived as greater than the cost, given the 
probability of success, the likelihood of civil conflict increases.  
The rational choice theory on ethnic collective violence is based on the assumption that 
individuals have given goals, wants, tastes or utilities. Since all goals cannot be equally 
realized because of scarcity, individuals will choose between alternative courses of action so 
as to maximize these wants and utilities. The resulting action may be seen as the end product 
of two successive filtering devices. Individuals choose the most efficient way to realize their 
goal (Hechter, Friedman and Appelbaum 1982 415–16).  
Taking into account the findings done by Montalvo and Reynal-Quearol (2005), and Ellingsen 
(2000) the size of an ethnic group is also important when arguing for ethnicity as an indicator 
for opportunity. If the largest ethnic group is under 80 percent there is a higher likelihood of 
civil war onset, than if the group is over 80 percent (Ellingsen 2000). If a country is close to 
homogenous a smaller ethnic group does a cost-benefit analysis, and concludes that they have 
no change to increase their well-being if starting a rebellion. On the other hand, if a country is 
fractionalized there will be several groups of some size, but not large enough to dominate, and 
calculate with victory. This demonstrates that there is a close link between ethnicity and 
opportunity, and that ethnicity can be seen as an indicator for opportunity.  Based on this and 
an ethnic individual and group as a rational actor the second hypothesis is presented: 
 H2: Ethnicity is an indicator of opportunity 
 
2.3.5 The Link between Ethnicity, Identity and Civil Conflict 
The third link sees a shared ethnic identity as a sufficient mobilization factor for civil war 
onset. Both explanations for civil war onset presented over do not see ethnicity as a direct 
cause in itself, but below I argue that it is.  
 
Moving outside of Collier and Hoefflers (2004) two models for civil war, it is argued that 
ethnic identity, and ethnic group identity is sufficient in order to mobilize for civil war (Harff 
and Gurr 1993). Identity “separates us from them”, it includes relations within, across and 
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outside those boundaries giving meaning to both boundaries and relations (Tilly and Tarrow 
2007: 79). Ethnicity as a cause of war in itself demonstrates the importance of ethnic identity 
for each individual. Ethnicity has an enormous power when it becomes a predominant identity 
(Wolff 2006: 31). It is the fundamental characteristics of ethnicity that makes it so powerful. 
These are characteristics such as language, religion, heritage and territory, and are the same 
characteristics that are central in the definition of ethnic groups (Ellingsen 2000). Ethnic 
groups already hold the advantage of common ideology, values and culture. This makes it 
easy to recruit participants for rebellion According to Harff and Gurr 1993) the strength of the 
group identity is one of the most important factors that can explain why ethnic groups 
participate in civil conflict. Ethnic bonds are very emotionally charged, and to some degree 
also irrational (Østby 2008).    
 
The role of ethnic identity as a powerful mechanism for civil war onset in itself, is according 
to Toft (2002) linked to the importance of territory. Territory is not only linked to the identity 
of the ethnic group, but it is also an important factor in the survival of the group. The link 
between territory and ethnicity is shown empirically by Buhaug (2006) who find ethnic 
fractionalization to be significant for onset of territorial conflict, but not governmental 
conflicts.
15
 It is only natural that ethnic groups live within the same territory and that territory 
function as a security for their survival and identity (Horowitz 2000: 201) If their territory is 
threatened, the salience of ethnic identity become apparent, and the group must protect their 
territory in order to secure their identity and survival (Toft 2002).    
 
In other words ethnicity must be seen as a mechanism in itself based on identity, and not as a 
function of either grievance or opportunity. How much a person identifies with an ethnic 
group depends on the number of traits that are shared by group members (Harff and Gurr 
1993). Arguing that ethnic identity in itself is a mechanism for civil war onset is based on a 
primordialist view on the connection between ethnicity and conflict. According to 
primordialists civil war is only a result of differences between groups, an no other factor in 
society, like political or economic differences. Conflicts involving ethnic groups are a result 
of “ancient hatred” (Blimes 2006; Østby 2011). The salience of ethnic identity is a direct 
mechanism for civil war onset. Based on this the last hypothesis is presented.    
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 A territorial conflict is defined to be involving demands for autonomy and secession. Governmental conflict 
are concerning the replacement of the central government, type of political system, or change in the composition 
of the government (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619).  
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 H3: Ethnicity is an indicator for civil conflict in itself 
 
In this chapter the theoretical framework is built up in order to answer the research question: 
Through what mechanism does ethnic fractionalization work as an indicator for civil conflict 
onset? Based on Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) civil war can be 
conceptualized as either grievance or opportunity. Based on this, the concept of grievance and 
the deprived actor theory, followed by opportunity and the rational actor theory was 
presented. Thereafter the theoretical and empirical relationship between ethnicity and civil 
war was put forward. I argued ethnic fractionalization is an indicator of either grievance, 
opportunity or in itself, due to the salience of ethnic identity, using theory presented earlier in 
the chapter. This resulted in three mutually exclusive hypotheses. Model 1, below, 
demonstrates the theorized mechanisms between ethnicity, and civil war. As the model show 
it is only the arrows on the left that is important in order to answer the research question, 
ethnicity has above been theorized as an indicator of each of them:  
 
Figure 2. Overview of theoretical framework 
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3 Research Design 
In this chapter I first present the updated measure of ethnic fractionalization. A short chapter 
on methodology follows, before looking at logistic regression analysis using time-series 
cross-sectional data.  Factor analysis is then presented, this is the method used to answer the 
research question. Thereafter, I present the dependent variables civil conflict and civil war. 
Last the variables used in the regression analysis and factor analysis is presented, theorized as 
either grievance variables or opportunity variables.  
 
3.1. Updated measure on ethnicity 
This thesis has two contributions to the research on civil war onset. For the first one of them 
the theoretical framework is presented over, looking at through what mechanisms ethnicity 
does works as an indicator for civil conflict onset. The second contribution is an updated 
version of the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index. Measuring ethnicity with the 
ELF-index is the most commonly used measure in quantitative research (Collier 2001: 132; 
Kalyvas 2008). The index gives the likelihood of two randomly drawn individuals within a 
country belongs different ethnic groups, taking on values between 0 and 1. It is calculated 
based on the Herfindahl calculation formula
16
, by subtracting the value of the Herfindahl 
formula from 1, the ELF-value is given as:  
  
2
1
1
n
ii
ELF s

  , where is is the share of group i (i=1,…,n)   (1) 
 
The ELF index is originally based on a global survey of ethnic groups published in Atlas 
Narodov Mira (1964), and was first calculated by Taylor and Hudson (1972). In the period 
after Taylor and Hudson (1972) other variants of the index measuring fractionalization have 
been put forward. Alesine et al. (2003) distinguishes between ethnic, religious and linguistic 
groups. They use their list of distinctions between the three, and develop a fractionalization 
index for ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization. It is calculated using the same 
formula as the ELF-index, but it is based on other data (Alesine et al 2003). Developing an 
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 The index was developed by the economists Herfindahl and Hirschman, it is originally named the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index. It is a statistic measure of concentration. The index is commonly used to account for the 
number of firms in a marked, and by incorporating the relative size of the firm it gives the concentration. It is 
calculated as follows
2
1
n
ii
HHI s

 , where si is the share of firms i in the marked, and n is the number of 
firms. The calculation is done by squaring the marked shares of all the firms in the marked. Calculation the ELF-
index it is the relative size of an ethnic group that is studied instead of firms (Kelly 1981).  
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index for cultural fractionalization, Fearon (2003) argues that it is important to measure the 
“ethnic distance” across groups. The distance is measured in three diagrams of families, of 
languages, and of different countries. Based on the data he collected a new ELF index with 
some additional characteristics was applied to research, the index was based on data from 
early 1990.  
 
Since the early 1990s the world has changed, and it is about time that the measure on ethnic 
fractionalization is updated. As a contribution to the research field I have done this in 
association to the thesis. Similar to Alesine et al. (2003), and Fearon (2003) the new ELF-
index is coded based on secondary data. Contrary to the earlier expansions, and recoding of an 
ELF-index, the updated version is calculated on no other features than the Herfindahl-index. 
An updated ELF-value has been calculated for all countries in the world, and has been done 
based on available information, mainly from Ethnic Groups World Wide, CIA World 
Factbook, Joshua Project and Library of Congress. Using the different sources as a control for 
one another, the most updated measures have been applied. Information from the different 
sources was mostly consistent with one another.
17
  
 
Coding the composition for ethnic groups in all the countries around the world is based on an 
arbitrary process, it is difficult to answer the question “What are the ethnic groups in this 
country?” with a single right answer (Fearon 2003: 197). This gives room to the 
instrumentalist and constructivist view on ethnicity as a fuzzy, and situational character 
(Fearon 2003: 197). Or as Fenton (2008: 3) puts it ethnicity is “something ‘out there’”, which 
corresponds to what observers call ethnicity. Fearon (2003) points to the problems related to 
Hispanics as an ethnic group in the USA, why should they not be divided into Cuban 
Americans, Puerto Rican Americans, Mexican Americans, and so on? The same difficulty is 
applicable for Arabs from different countries. In the work of coding the updated measure used 
in this thesis, the term Arab and Hispanic has been applied. It has not been distinguished any 
further between the differences within these groups. The problem presented by Fearon (2003) 
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 CIA Factbook often referred to a given percentage, noting that this percentage of the population consisted of 
several ethnic groups. One example of this is Democratic Republic of Congo, data presented by CIA factbook 
summarize the three largest ethnic groups to make out 45 percent of the population, whereas the country as a 
whole have more than 200 ethnic groups. In these cases Joshua Project has been used listing several of the ethnic 
groups in the country, although the exact accuracy can be discussed it does undeniably give a much more 
appropriate ELF-value for the country.   
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illustrates that it is not straight forward to define and update the measures for ethnic 
fractionalization.  
 
Some critique has been directed towards the use of the ELF-index in quantitative research. It 
has by the constructivist perspective on ethnicity been critiqued for being a constant measure, 
having the same value for a country over a time period of time (Laitin and Posner 2001; 
Kalyvas 2008). As an answer to this critique, the updated ELF-index is not seen as an 
independent index from the former ones, and the variable used in the empirical analyses is 
based on an interpolation
18
 between the ones presented by Fearon (2003) and the updated 
ones from 2011. The variable ETHFRACIPOLATED has been kept constant up until 1990 (6 
time units in the dataset), using the data from Fearon (2003). In the time period between 1990 
and 2011 the values has been interpolated. By interpolating between the two time units the 
changes in the concentration of ethnic groups is reflected in the variable  
 
As an addition to a factor analysis using the variable ETHFRACIPOLATED as a measure of 
ethnicity, it is of interest to include a variable that link together ethnicity and civil conflict in a 
second factor analysis. Including such a variable gives a representation of the relationship 
between civil war and ethnicity in the factor analysis. Further, it functions as a robust check 
for the factor analysis that includes ETHFRACIPOLATED as a measure for ethnicity. The second 
variable measuring ethnicity is as mentioned pinpointed towards war, and is therefore called 
ETHFRACWAR. Based on results of former research on civil war onset it is reason to assume 
that there is a curvilinear relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil war onset (De 
Soysa 2002; Motalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). By doing a logistic regression analysis
19
 with 
civil conflict onset as the dependent variable, ETHFRACIPOLATED and the squared term of 
ETHFRACIPOLATED the vertex of the relationship between civil conflict onset and ethnicity is 
calculated.
20
 As shown in Figure 3 the curvilinear effect takes the shape of an inverted-u, with 
a vertex when the level of fractionalization is equal 0.78.  
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  Interpolation is a method that draw a straight line between the two known points, in this case the old ELF-
values and the new ELF-values. The values at the different time units will be used to fill in the values in between 
the two points. 
19
 Time-series cross-sectional data is used, this method is presented in chapter 3.3.  
20
 See appendix A, Table A1 for the results from the logistic regression analysis. 
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Figure 3: Likelihood of civil conflict onset, by level of ethnic fractionalization 
 
 
Recoding ETHFRACIPOLATED, so that it is pinpointed toward that likelihood of civil conflict 
onset, ELF-values equal to 0.78 was coded as 1. Due to the curvilinear relationship, and the 
property of a second order function as being symmetric around the vertex, ELF-values equal 
to 0.77, and 0.79 were coded equal to 0.99, resulting in the new variable named 
ETHFRACWAR.
21
 Both of the variables ETHFRACIPOLATED and ETHFRACWAR are included in 
two separate factor analyses presented in the next chapter. ETHFRACIPOLATED is first used to 
test the new ELF-index up against civil conflict, and to test for an empirical connection 
between ethnicity and civil conflict onset using well established variables in quantitative 
analysis on civil war onset as control variables. Before presenting the results from these 
analyses the different statistical methods that are used will be presented below, but first a 
short overview over the methodology.  
 
3.2 Methodology  
Concisely stated, ontology can be explained as the study of realtiy, while espistemology is the 
study of the nature of knowledge (Hay 2002; Moses and Knutsen 2007). The ontological 
position in this thesis is that there exists a real world that is independent of our perception of 
it. This view is in line with the positivist tradition,  which state that the world is made up of 
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 0.76 and 0.80 were coded as 0.98. 0.75 and 0.81 were coded as 0.88 and so on.  
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regularities. The positivist tradition gives a epistemological view that these regularities can be 
detected, and that the researcher can gather knowledge about the real world by observing it 
(Moses and Knutsen 2007). In order to gather knowledge about the world a method is needed. 
Methodology can according to Hay (2002: 63) be described as, “the choice of analytical 
strategy and research design which underpins substantive research”, or as the logic behind the 
methods the researches chose.  Following the positivist tradition, the statistical method for 
testing hypotheses is chosen in this thesis, this is the closest approach to experimental method 
Because of its ability to order and control temporal and casual relationships the experimental 
method is often seen as the best positivist method (Moses and Knutsen 2007).   
 
The goal of scientific research is to draw conclusions that go beyond the collected data. By 
doing large-N studies it is possible to make generalizations about the casual effect of different 
phenomena. In this thesis a whole population of countries is examined, and generalized with 
stochastic model theory. In time-series analysis there are trends, this means that it is a 
stochastic variation around a non-constant mean. If one assumes that the model is 
deterministic, the variation around the mean is constant. Assuming that there is a stochastic 
trend in the data it allows for more flexibility in the estimation and form, which results in a 
model that is better fit to the data (Pevehouse and Brozek 2008. 461) 
 
3.4 Logistic Regression with Time-Series Cross-Sectional Data 
The first analysis presented in the next chapter, Analysis, is a logistic regression analysis
22
 
with the dependent variable civil conflict onset and civil war onset. These are both 
dichotomous variable with the categories being onset (=1) and no onset (=0)
23
, based on this a 
maximum likelihood logistic model applied. According to Hamilton (1992) this approach 
gives a model that is easy to interpret. Time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data is used to 
analyze data that has repeated observations, on the same fixed unit. In this thesis the repeated 
observations are yearly, and the units are countries (Beck 2011).  Since the dependent 
variables are dichotomous logistic regression will be applied, the method can be referred to as 
binary time-series cross-section (BTCSC) method (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998). Table 2, 
presented in the empirical analysis is a logistic regression with BTSCS-data. Using time series 
or, longitudinal data, the assumption of independent variables in logistic regression breached. 
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 Due to the secondary importance of this method in the thesis, the challenges assumptions for logistic 
regression will not be discussed. The focus is on the challenges when performing logistic regression with TSCS 
data.  
23
 More info about the variable in section 3.3.1 
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Longitudinal is repeated measurements of different variables, and can be defined as data 
collected based on observed units of n number of variables over a period of time (Hox 2010: 
109).  
 
A challenge when using TSCS data is the temporal dependence, or autocorrelation (Midtbø 
2012). The dependent variables in this analysis civil conflict/war onset are dependent on 
peace years, i.e. the number of years that has passed since the country last experienced civil 
conflict/war. Not addressing the established fact of temporal dependence would provide 
misleading results (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998). Using the onset of civil conflict/war from 
the UCDP/PRIO dataset some of the problem is reduces by coding civil war onset instead of 
incidence (the year of ongoing conflict after year of onset is coded 0 for the dependent 
variable), this means dropping consecutive years where there are conflict/war from the 
analysis. But this does not solve the entire problem, peace periods will still be correlated over 
a period of time. 
 
In research on civil war onset there are two methods that are frequently used in order to 
handle the problem of temporal dependence. One is to include the lagged dependent variable 
as in independent variable; the second is to use natural cubic spline with three knots
24
. The 
lagged dependent variable only control for time dependence one year back, while cubic spline 
will reflect that the effect of number of years since the last occurrence of conflict will 
decrease rapidly after few year, in a nonlinear function (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998). 
Whereas Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) chose to use a lagged 
version of the dependent variable in their articles. In this thesis natural cubic splines will be 
used to handle temporal dependence. This method is used by other scholars (e.g. Chiozza 
2002; Walter 2004; Regan and Norton 2005; Buhaug 2006).  
 
It is not only regarding the dependent variable that time must be taken into consideration 
when using BTSCS data, but also  for independent variables that varies over time. Studding 
onset of civil war and using BTSCS data with yearly observation, it is less likely that it is the 
observations from the year of onset that best explain the conflict (Midtbø, 2012). For example 
it is not very logical that it was GDP per capita calculated at the end of the year conflict onset 
that influenced the onset of conflict. More likely is that GDP per capita the year before that 
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 See Appendix C, C5 for further information  
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again can help explain the onset of the conflict. In order to correct for this GDP per capita is 
lagged. In this thesis the time dependent variables used in the logistic analysis have only been 
lagged one year, but it is possible to lag the variables more than one year. Take for instance 
the onset of conflict in Mali 1994. By lagging GDP per capita one year it is the GDP per 
capita in 1993 that is matched with the time unit 1994 in the dataset. Further GDP per capita 
for 1994 will be matched with the time unit 1995. In order to ensure the robustness of the 
results presented, they have been clustered by country in the analysis. Cluster analysis is a 
way of getting more robust results in the form of robust standard errors when doing a logistic 
analysis with BTSCS data. The analysis is used to identify and group units that are similar to 
each other. In this case a unit (country-year) is also related to other units belonging to the 
same country (Hamilton 2013).  
 
3.2 Factor Analysis 
The thesis includes two separate factor analyses, they are distinguished by the variables 
ETHFRACIPOLATED and ETHFRACWAR. Factor analysis as a method is used in the thesis in 
order to answer the research question Through what mechanism does ethnic fractionalization 
work as an indicator for civil conflict onset? The goal of a factor analysis is to present a larger 
set of variables in terms of a smaller number of hypothetical variables (Kim and Mueller 
1978a). There are two variants of factor analysis, namely confirmatory and exploratory. When 
using confirmatory factor analysis the researcher has an assumption of how many factors 
there will be before running the model, the goal here is to run an empirical check on the data 
that available.  
 
In this thesis exploratory factor analysis will be applied, within this variant there is no 
assumption on the number of factors that lie underneath and explain the correlation between 
the different variables (Ulleberg and Nordvik 2001). The selection of variables to be included 
in the factor analysis is done based on theory, and the results in former research on civil war 
onset, and they have an adequate number of observations.
25
 Although three possible links 
between ethnicity and civil war onset has been theorized, the theory and the variables give no 
clear indication as to how many factors they will be sorted into when doing the analysis. 
Which variables that are placed under which factors are based on the correlation between the 
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 The reason given for including the different variables is given when presenting the different variables, se 
section  3.6.2. 
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different variables, and the estimation of scores and loadings are done based on the estimation 
of covariance (Filzmoser et al. 2009).
 26
  
 
After selecting which variables to include in the factor analysis there are three important 
decisions to be taken when doing an exploratory factor analysis: 1) what factor extraction 
model to use, 2) the number of factors retained, and 3) what method is used to rotate factors 
(Conway and Huggcutt 2003: 150). First, there are different types of options when it comes to 
what type of extraction model to use. Here a principal axis factor analysis is done; this choice 
has been made based on the aim of the factor analysis, which is to understand the unobserved 
structure that explains the relationship among measured variables (Conway and Huggcutt 
2003: 151).
27
 The next decision is to decide how many factors to retain. Experience and 
research has shown that this is an extremely important step - different techniques leads to 
different results regarding the number of factors to keep. The most common technique is the 
eigenvalue specification. The factors that are retained have an eigenvalue over 1. Another way 
of deciding how many factors to keep is to do a scree-plot. This allows the researcher to 
examine the eigenvalues in a graph. Based on the graph one should keep all factors until the 
graph starts to flatten out (Kim and Muller 1978b: 43f). Both ways of retaining the number of 
factors are more or less the same. In this thesis both of the techniques has been applied. The 
use of a multiple of techniques gives the most robust selection of variables. Based on the 
screeplot
28
 from the factor analysis in Table 3 the slope decreases after including three factors, 
but factor 4 have and eigenvalue over 1
29
, and is therefore retained in the analysis as well.
30
  
After deciding how many factors to retain one can start looking at, and interpreting how the 
different variables load within the different factor.  
 
The third and final stage is to rotate the results from the factor analysis. This is done in order 
to find a more interpretable result. It can be difficult to interpret the loading of the varibales 
without rotating the factor analysis. It is an important criterion for interpretation that the factor 
analysis has a “simple structure”, this means that each factor is defined by a subset of 
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 Variables that had uniqueness over 0.7 were excluded from the analysis. Uniqueness give information about 
how much of the variables variance that is not explained by the factors included in the table. The closer the 
uniqueness is to 1, the less the variable belongs in the factor analysis (Treiblmaier and Filzmoser 2010).  
27
 The alternative is principal factor analysis; this is used when the aim of the study is a pure reduction of the 
number of variables, without interpreting the results (Conway & Huffcutt 2003: 151).   
28
 Se Appendix C, Figure C1. 
29
 See Table 3 in section 4.2 for eigenvalues of the four factors retained.  
30
 Screeplot and eigenvalues for Table 4 give the same number of factor. See Figure C2 for screeplot, and Table 
4 for eigenvalues 
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measured variables that have high loading on the factor relative to the other variables in the 
analysis (Fabrigar et al. 1999: 281). The “simple structure” becomes more apparent when the 
factor analysis is rotated. There are two types of rotation that can be used, orthogonal and 
oblique rotation. Orthogonal rotation is based on uncorrelated factors, whereas oblique allows 
factor to be correlated – the last one being most likely in factor analysis done in the thesis. 
Ford et al. (1986), Fabrigar et al. (1999), and Conway and Huffcutt (2003) argue that oblique 
rotation gives the best quality on the rotation and the analysis. If factors are more or less 
uncorrelated the oblique rotation will have a low correlation between the factors instead of no 
correlation, and is therefore a safe choice in all cases, and is the one applied in this thesis 
(Conway and Huffcutt 2003: 152f). Within oblique rotation there are again different choices, 
in this thesis promax oblique rotation has been used, the rationale explanation behind this is 
that: 
the orthogonal solutions are usually close to the oblique solution, and by reducing the 
smaller loading to near-zero loading, one can obtain a reasonably good simple 
structure matrix. Then by finding the best fitting oblique factors for this target matrix, 
one obtains the desired solution (Kim and Mueller 1978b: 40).  
After rotating the factor analysis the different variable loadings must be interpreted. The 
higher the loading of a variable, the more the variable has to say when identifying the 
hypothetical variable that is made out of the different factor scores. Naming to the new 
hypothetical variables is done based on the variables that load on the factor, the variables are 
already given theoretical meaning when deciding to include then in the analysis. The variables 
that have the highest loading have the highest influence when naming the factor. Again, this is 
done based on the theoretical operationalization of the variable.  
 
3.6 Variables 
The analysis is based on 175 states over the time period 1985– 2010, that includes a total of 
4,471 units (country-years) that are included in the analysis. First, the dependent variable is 
presented, this is used in the logistic regression analyses that is included in the theses in order 
to test the new ELF-index, and establish an empirical relationship between conflict and ethnic 
fractionalization.  
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3.6.1 The dependent variables 
The dependent variables in the logistic regression analysis are civil conflict onset and civil 
war onset.
31
 Both are dichotomous variables that give information on civil conflict/war onset 
in the observed year, in a given country. They are equal 1 if there was an onset to conflict/war 
registered and 0 if it was not.
32
 The difference between the variables is the threshold of battle 
related deaths. UCDP/PRIO defines civil conflict onset with a yearly threshold of more than 
25 battle deaths. The definition of civil war is a threshold of at least 1000 battle related deaths 
in a given year. Further a new conflict/war is only registered if there is 2 years or more since 
the last observed conflict/war. It is worth emphasizing that the variable is only coded 1 in the 
year of civil conflict/war onset, although the conflict/war might continue several more years 
the next years are given the value 0. Since the onset variable only registers a conflict/war in 
the year it erupts it cannot be used to control for autocorrelation. In order to control for 
autocorrelation it is the incidence variable in the UCDP/PRIO -dataset that must be used. Here 
there are two options, either lagging the incidence variable one year, or using cubic splines. 
As already mentioned cubic spline is used in this thesis. The incidence variable gives 
information on whether or not there was an incidence of conflict/war in the country a given 
year, and by using this variable we get the information needed in order to control for 
autocorrelation.    
 
3.6.2 Other variables 
When building up a dataset to use in the thesis it was important to include variables that can 
be seen as indicators of either grievance or opportunity based on theoretical arguments, this is 
in order to have variables that are clearly associated with grievance or greed when 
recognizing the spate factors in the factor analysis. In order to get factors that are clearly 
separated as grievance or opportunity factors variables that are not so commonly used in 
research on civil war onset, but associated with either grievance of opportunity is also 
included. It is worth noticing that not all the variables are used in both the factor analysis and 
the logistic regression. In which analysis the variable is used is specified when presenting the 
variable.
33
 If the variable is included in the regression analysis in additisn to the factor 
analyses this is specified. All variables except from MOUTIAN is used in the factor analysis. 
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 For descriptive statistic se Table B1 and Table B2 in Appendix B.  
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 Both variables are from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2012 
33
 See Table B3, B4 and B5 for descriptive statistics for these variables. For further information on the variables 
besides what is presented here, see the sources (World Bank 2013).  
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Theoretical grievance variables 
POPULATION: is one of the most robust variables in research on civil war onset, although it is 
rather under-theorized (Dixon 2009; Jakobsen, De Soysa and Jakobsen 2013). Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) state that population and grievance are related when they argue that grievance 
might rise with population. “Population-related pressures can create demands on the 
government to provide equal access to increasingly scarce resources and may, in fact, result in 
political violence, when citizens feel their demands are not met” (Abouharb and Kimball 
2005: 750). The variable POPULATION gives the number of people living in a country (World 
Bank 2013a). Due to its robustness, and the common use of it, this variable is included in both 
the regression analysis and the factor analysis. In both the logistic regression analysis and the 
factor analysis the variable has been log-transformed, this is done in order to make the 
variable less squeed further the relative size is given in more meaningful units.
34
 Since the 
variable also is time-dependent it has been lagged one year when used in the logistic 
regression analysis (Midtbø 2012).  
 
POPULATION GROWTH: is included as a grievance variable based on the same argument as 
population. If the level of grievance rises with the increase in population it must also raise 
when the population grows. Population growth is “Population-related pressure”, and does 
therefore result in grievance (Abouharb and Kimball 2005: 750). The variable gives the 
annual population growth in percentage, based on the total population (World Bank 2013b).  
 
POLITY: Along with population democracy is also one of the variables that are most robust in 
research. The level of democracy or no democracy is by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) modeled 
as a factor of grievance. It is seen as a measure of grievance based in the qualities of a 
democracy compared to countries that are not democracies (Smith 2009). In order to measure 
the level of democracy the Polity scale is used. Polity is based on a scale from -10 to 10 
(Polity IV).
35
 In the factor analysis the variable is included as it is originally. In the regression 
analysis the variable has been recoded into a dummy variable with three categories. Values 
below -5 are referred to as AUTOCRACY, and values above 6 are coded as DEMOCRACY. The 
reference category, ANOCRACY represents the values between -4 and 6.
36
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 Earlier research on causes for civil war also uses the log of a given states population (Dixon 2009).  
35
 Countries that have -10 are seen as fully autocratic states, and countries with 10 are fully democratic states 
36
 The variable has been dummy coded in the regression analysis in order to demonstrate the inverted-u shape 
between regime type, and civil war onset that has been documented by Hegre et al (2001).  
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MILITARY SPENDING: Countries that have a high military spending, does not necessarily care 
much for the welfare of its citizens, and the grievance among people grows. This is also 
related to grievance after civil war, and the risk of a new civil war. After a war is ended 
countries keep spending a lot of money on the military instead of building up the country, this 
leads to grievance among people expecting a better state services after the war is over 
(Murshed 2002). another reason why military spending is seen as an grievance indicator is 
that the citizens of a country might see high military spending as an indication of a 
governments ill-intent (Collier et al 2003: 87). This variable measures military expenditures 
as a percentage share of countries GDP (World Bank 2013c).
37
 
 
EMPOWERMENT RIGHTS: is an additive scale
38
 controlling for the governments respect for 
different categories.
39
  It is a 15 point scale where 0 is given to countries where the 
government has no respect for the rights, and 14 for countries where the government respect 
the rights (Cingranelli and Richards 2008). According to Gurr (1983) repression of citizens is 
a mechanism that is used by the ruling elite to ensure their power, this in turn may cause 
grievance among those that are not part of the ruling elite. This variable is included in the 
regression analysis as well as the factor analysis, in the regression analysis it is lagged one 
year due to its time dependence. 
 
PHYSICAL INTEGRITY RIGHTS: is also an additive index, and it gives the rights not to be 
extrajudicially killed, tortured or disappeared, or imprisoned for political belief. Having a low 
score on this 9 point scale indicates that there is an inequality between groups and individuals 
within a country, which is seen as typical indicators for grievance (Cingranelli and Richards 
2008). A low score means that the government do not respect any of the five indicator 
mentioned. The same argument can be applied here as for EMPOWERMENT RIGHTS; the ruling 
elite use these methods in order to secure their power (Gurr 1983).  
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 It includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces. Excluded are civil defenses and current 
expenditures for previous military activities (World Bank 2013) 
38
 An additative scale is created by adding the individuals score for a number of different human right practices. 
It is created from disaggregated components, and there is no a priori assumption of patterns.  
39
 The categories are: freedom of movement, freedom of speech, workers’ rights, political participation and 
freedom of religion.  
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Theoretical Opportunity Variables 
GDP PER CAPITA: is one of the most common variables when analyzing the risk of civil war 
onset. A robust finding is that GDP PER CAPITA is negatively associated with the risk of civil 
war onset (Dixon 2009). Collier and Hoeffler (2004), use GDP PER CAPITA in their opportunity 
model. The variable has by Jakobsen, De Soysa and Jakobsen (2013) been captured within a 
wealth factor for civil war onset, alongside other variables. Fearon and Laitin (2003: 75) use a 
low per capita income as a proxy for police and counterinsurgent weakness. GDP PER CAPITA 
is calculated based on the gross domestic product, and divided by the midyear population 
(World Bank 2013d). Due to the large difference in values in the variable it has been log 
transformed. This variable is also included in the logistic regression analysis. Therefore, in 
addition to being log-transformed it has also been lagged one year in order to control for the 
time dependence in the regression analysis. 
 
FUEL EXPORT: researchers have found fuel export to be positively and one of the most robust 
variables associated with the risk of civil war onset (Dixon 2009). FUEL EXPORT represents 
the much debated link between natural resources and civil war onset. This is a variable that 
has been used as a proxy for ooportunity. Rebel groups sell contrabands to earn money, which 
give them opportunity to rebel (Ross 2004; Ross 2006: 265). In this paper the measure for fuel 
export is coded into a dummy variable based on data from World Bank (2013e). In countries 
where fuel export exceeds 1/3 of total merchandise export, the variable has been given the 
value 1, otherwise it is given the value 0. In the regression analysis this variable is lagged one 
year, due to its time dependence.  
 
BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY: A bureaucracy with high quality is able to police national territory, 
and provide services that that makes the citizens less rebellious (Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
Further, countries that have a strong bureaucracy are able to hinder rebellion (DeRouen and 
Sobek 2004). A weak bureaucracy is associated with a financially weak states, this is due to 
the costs associated with a well-functioning bureaucracy (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Grounded 
on this theoretical arguments it is expected that bureaucratic quality is associated with a 
countries wealth. On the 4 point high scores is given to countries where the bureaucracy has 
the expertise and strength to keep govern without interruption in the government services and 
extreme changes in policy, and low scores in countries where this is not the case. In cases of 
governments change there tends to be a traumatic change in policy constructions and the 
administrative functions (ICRG 2011).  
34 
 
 
LAW AND ORDER: is closely associated with the quality of the bureaucracy. In order for the 
legal system to be functioning well it need legitimacy and the economic resources (DeRouen 
and Sobek 2004). LAW AND ORDER give information about a countries wealth. The two 
aspects of law and order are coded separately, and together they make up a 6 point scale. The 
component of law gives information about the impartiality and strength of the legal system, 
the order component is a valuation of how the law is observed. A high score on the law and 
order- scale is a logical indication of a state’s capacity to control what happens within its 
borders (ICRG 2011).   
 
AGRICULURE: In developing countries the primary sector of the economy is dominant. Poor 
conditions for agriculture hold severe implications for socio-economic development and avoid 
conflict. Most of the armed conflicts are focused in regions that are heavily dependent on 
agriculture. Agriculture can be seen as a proxy for capacity, because countries that are 
depending on agriculture often have a “backward” economy, and that the link that the link 
that work between agriculture is poverty. (De Soysa and Gleditch 1999). The variable gives 
agriculture as percentage of GDP; this includes hunting forestry, and fishing, livestock 
production, and cultivation of crops.
40,
 (World Bank 2013f).  
 
LIFE EXPECTANCY: Life expectancy in a country is affected by several factors, infant/birth 
mortality rates is one of these factors. Countries with a high infant/birth mortality rate have a 
higher risk of civil war onset, compared to countries that have lower infant/birth mortality 
rates. This is associated with the development in the country, which is highly associated with 
the economic capacities of a country (Dixon 2009).
41
 Based on this LIFE EXPECTANCY is a 
variable that say something about a countries wealth. The variable gives life expectancy at 
birth, this calculation is based on different indicators (World Bank 2013g).  
 
RURAL POPULATION: In the process of recruitment rebel groups finds it helpful to deny 
government troops access to rural areas. Today rebel groups establish themselves along the 
rim of the country borders. This is possible in poor countries, or countries with poor 
bureaucratic quality. People in rural areas might not feel the same type of loyalty to the state, 
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 This variable is not log-transformed because it is given in percentage (Midtbø 2012).  
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 Due to the problem of missing observations the variable measuring mortality rate was not used in the analysis. 
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which give rebel groups opportunity to recruit (Weinstein 2005). RURAL POPULATION give 
the percentage of the population that are living in rural areas (World Bank 2013h). 
 
EDUCATIONAL SPENDING: Several studies have included variables that are linked to education 
in some matter (Dixon 2009). This is an economic variable and is therefore included as a 
measure for opportunity. Educational spending is calculated based on the public spending on 
education as a percentage of the total GDP in a given year (World Bank 2013i).  
 
MOUNTAIN: In their research Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) find 
that countries that have rough terrain have a higher risk of civil war onset. Based on these 
results the variable mountain is included in the regression analysis. The data for the variable is 
from Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and their mountain variable. Over the time period in their 
analysis the percentage of country territory that was covered of mountains where kept 
constant. Based on the constant property of mountains and the variable, the values for each 
country are kept constant over all time-unit periods of the analysis. Terrain is a simple factor 
for indicating military visibility (Collier et al. 2003: 71). This variable is only included in the 
regression analysis.  
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4 Analysis 
This chapter presents the results from the empirical analysis. First the results from the 
regression analysis are put forward, the reason for including this analysis is to test for an 
empirical relationship between ethnicity, and civil conflict and war when using the updated 
ELF-index. Further, to test for a curvilinear relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict. 
The results show that the relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict onset is highly 
significant, also when controlling for the proposed curvilinear relationship. Second, the results 
from the factor analysis are presented. Two factor analyses are presented, one including the 
variable ETHFRACIPOLTAED, the other one includes ETHFRACWAR. Factor analysis is used in 
this thesis in order to answer the research question: Through what mechanism does ethnic 
fractionalization work as an indicator for civil conflict onset? The results support the 
assumption arguing that ethnicity is a mechanism for civil conflict onset in itself, due to the 
salience of ethnic identity.  
 
4.1 Linking Ethnic Fractionalization to Civil Conflict Onset 
As pointed out earlier in the thesis, there is no unitary agreement on whether or not ethnic 
fractionalization leads to civil war. Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
find no significant link between ethnicity and civil war onset, whereas Sambanis (2001), and 
Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009) find a significant relationship between the two. Common 
for all these scholars is that they have used a dependent variable measuring civil war onset 
with a threshold of 1000 battle related deaths. Scholars that use a threshold of 25 battle related 
death, or a similar measure with for low intensity conflicts all find a significant relationship 
between ethnicity, and civil conflict onset (Ellingsen 2000; Regan and Norton 2005; Buhaug 
2006; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). In the following regression analysis I have used both 
dependent variables in order to see if the updated ELF-index gives the same results as other 
scholars. A significant relationship with a threshold of 25 battle related deaths can be 
expected based on earlier research, but with a threshold of 1000 battle related deaths it is more 
difficult to predict an outcome of the analysis due to the different findings done by other 
scholars.  
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Table 2. Logistic regression, coefficient (st.error), civil conflict/war onset 
 
There are mainly two reasons for including the regression analysis in the thesis, first, in order 
to test for an empirical relationship between ethnicity, and civil conflict and war, when using 
the updated ELF-index. The second reason is to test for a curvilinear relationship between 
ethnicity and civil conflict and war. A significant curvilinear relationship between ethnic 
fractionalization and civil conflict would demonstrate that it is a higher likelihood for civil 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
Conflict 
 
Model 2 
Conflict 
Model 4 
War 
Model 5 
War 
 
Population¤ 0.315*** 
(0.113) 
0.364*** 
(0.108) 
0.123 
(0.119) 
0.129 
(0.129) 
 
GDP per capita¤ -0.286** 
(0.145) 
-0.370*** 
(0.153) 
-0.496*** 
(0.178) 
-0.511*** 
(0.186) 
 
Fuel exporter 0.803** 
(0.320) 
0.823*** 
(0.153) 
0.643 
(0.448) 
0.634 
(0.450) 
 
Mountain 0.004 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
 
Authocracya -0.341 
(0.345) 
-0.234 
(0.344) 
0.068** 
(0.510) 
-1.054** 
(0.511) 
 
Democracya 0.658* 
(0.390) 
0.601* 
(0.365) 
-0.193* 
(0.874) 
-1.248* 
(0.769) 
 
Empowerment rights -0.091** 
(0.037) 
-0.083** 
(0.038) 
-0.998 
(0.068) 
-0.101 
(0.068) 
 
EthfracIpolated 1.665*** 
(0.484) 
7.712*** 
(2.207) 
0.101 
(0.832) 
-0.819 
(3.561) 
 
EthfracIpolated
2   
 
-6.374*** 
(2.211) 
 -0.788 
(3.904) 
 
Temporal dependence      
Peace years 0.093 
(0.190) 
0.112 
(0.193) 
0.302* 
(0.177) 
0.305* 
(0.086) 
 
Spline(1) 0.002 
(0.020) 
0.002 
(0.020) 
0.021** 
(0.009) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
 
Spline(2) 0.001 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.025** 
(0.012) 
-0.025** 
(0.012) 
 
Spline(3) -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.019* 
(0.011) 
0.020* 
(0.011) 
 
Constant -7.043*** 
(2.117) 
-8.401*** 
(2.121) 
-2.898 
(2.846) 
-1.933 
(2.925) 
 
      
Pesudo LL -321.361 -317.774 -130.516 -130.492  
Observations 2734 2734 2754 2754  
Years 1985-2010 1985-2010 1985-2010 1985-2010 
Note:Lagged one year, ¤Log transformed, a Anocracy as reference category,  
b
Probability of F-value, *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, and 
***significant at 1%. The units are clustered by country using Huber-White 
robust standard errors (White, 1980). 
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conflict onset if the country is not highly fractionalized or homogenous. This is the same 
argument as presented by Ellingsen (2000) and Montavlo and Reynal-Querol (2005). The 
results from the regression analysis are presented in Table 2. Following, the control variables 
is commented on shortly before looking closer at relationship between ethnicity and civil war 
onset. The control variables that are included in the analysis are variables that are commonly 
used in research on civil war onset. 
 
In Model 1 and Model 2 the dependent variable is civil conflict onset. The variables 
POPULATION, GDP PER CAPITA, FUEL EXPORT, and DEMOCRACY are variables that are 
robustly associated with civil conflict onset in earlier research. (Dixon 2009). The analysis 
shows that all these variables are significant when explaining civil conflict onset, but note that 
the direction of their influence varies. Democracy is part of a dummy set, and the results show 
that it is only democracy that is significant or civil conflict onset not autocracy. The variable 
PEACE YEAR with splines is as mentioned used to control for temporal dependence.
42
 The 
results show that the number of years since the last conflict is not significant for the likelihood 
of civil conflict onset. Whether or not a country had civil war in previous years is normally a 
variable that is shown robust in earlier research, but here, with civil conflict onset as 
dependent variable, it is not (Buhaug and Sambanis 2006; Dixon 2009). The variable 
MOUTIAN is also not significant for civil conflict onset. This is contrary to Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) who found that rough terrain favors rebellion, but in accordance with Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004), who found no significant relationship. The last variable EMPOWERMENT 
RIGHTS is not commonly used in research on civil war onset. It is included in order to have a 
clear grievance measure in the analysis. The results show that an increase on the scale 
measuring empowerment rights has a negative and significant effect on the risk for civil 
conflict onset.  
 
Having civil war as the dependent variable in Model 3 and Model 4, several of the control 
variables has lost its significance. Only GDP PER CAPITA and DEMOCRACY are still significant. 
ANOCRACY and the variables controlling for autocorrelation, PEACE YEARS whit splines are 
significant for civil war onset, and not civil conflict. All together this show that almost all the 
variables included in Table 2 is significant for either civil conflict onset, or civil war onset.  
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 As a test of roubsutness it has also been tested for temporal dependence by lagging the incidence variable, see 
Table A2 in Appendix A. This is the same as lagging the dependent variable, but due to the coding of the 
variables incidence must be used when UCDP/PRIO’s dataset is used.  
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Further, the results of the regression analysis in Model 1, where civil conflict is the dependent 
variable, show that there is a significant relationship between the updated variable measuring 
ethnic fractionalization, ETHFRACIPOLATED, and the risk of civil conflict onset. This is the 
same result as found in much of the literature (e.g. Ellingsen 2000; Regan and Norton 2005; 
Buhaug 2006; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Based on this result an empirical relationship 
between ethnicity and civil conflict onset is established. This creates the foundation to further 
investigate ethnicity as an indicator of regarding civil conflict onset. In Model 2 I have tested 
for a curvilinear relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil conflict onset. The 
results show that there is a significant curvilinear relationship between ethnic fractionalization 
and civil conflict onset, taking on the shape of an inverted-u. By this it follows that the 
likelihood of civil conflict onset is lower in countries that are homogenous, but increases as 
the level of fractionalization rise. Moving past the vertex, closer to a heterogeneous country, 
the likelihood of civil conflict onset decreases.
43
 Documenting a curvilinear relationship 
between ethnic fractionalization and civil conflict onset gives support to Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2005) and Ellingsen (2000), who argue that the size of an ethnic group 
matters for the likelihood of civil conflict onset. Further, the result also add empirical support 
to the argument that ethnicity is an indicator of opportunity.   
 
Looking at the results in Model 3 and Model 4, where civil war is the dependent variable, 
neither ETHFRACIPOLATED, nor ETHFRACIPOLATED2  is significant for the likelihood of civil 
war onset. This gives support to Coller and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
who found no significant effect of ethnic fractionalization of the likelihood of civil war onset. 
Since an empirical relationship between ethnic fractionalization, and civil conflict onset is 
established based on the significance between the two variables, it is reason to look at through 
what mechanisms ethnic fractionalization does work as an indicator for civil conflict onset.
44
 
Below the research question is addressed directly, and it will be answered whether or not 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) are right in operationalizing 
ethnicity as an indicator for grievance. Or if it is an indicator of opportunity, and even worse 
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 This relationship is taken into account in the factor analysis by coding the variable ETHFRACWAR. This 
variable is coded based on the binary relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil conflict onset, and 
presented earlier in the thesis.  
44
 The different results regarding ethnic fractionalization using respectively civil conflict, and civil war as 
dependent variables indicate that there are different mechanisms that explain onset of civil war and conflict. 
Regan and Norton (2005) present an argument, explaining some of these differences. 
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for Collier and Hoeffler (2004) an indicator of identity – a mechanism that is not included in 
their model for civil war onset.  
 
4.2 Through what mechanism does ethnicity work as in indicator? 
The theoretical framework presented earlier in the thesis created the foundation for three 
separate arguments. I argued that ethnicity is an indicator if grievance, as done by Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003). Second it was argued that ethnic 
fractionalization is an indicator of opportunity, and last, that ethnicity is an indicator in itself, 
due to the salience of ethnic identity. In order to answer the research question, through what 
mechanism does ethnic fractionalization work as an indicator for civil conflict onset?, an 
exploratory factor analysis is performed, using an oblique promax rotation.
45
 Two separate 
factor analyses was presented, the difference between the two analyses is the variable 
measuring ethnic fractionalization. Table 3 includes the variable ETHFRACIPOLATED, and 
Table 4 includes ETHFRACWAR, other than this the two factor analyses are identical. Since the 
result of the two factor analyses are very similar they are commented on correspondingly, the 
few differences between them are commented on consecutively. The two factor analyses 
identifies four different factors, these are given names based on theoretical belonging of the 
variables that loads on the different  factors.
46
 After identifying the factor as either a grievance 
or opportunity factor, relevant theory and belonging hypothesis are discussed, before moving 
on to the next factor. The result demonstrates that ethnic fractionalization is not an indicator 
of either grievance or opportunity, but an indicator in itsef. 
 
The variables that load on the first factor in the both Table 3, and Table 4 are variables that 
theoretically belong within the opportunity explanation for civil war onset. GDP PER CAPITA 
and AGRICULTURE have the highest loadings on the factor. These variables do theoretically 
say something about a countries wealth, and the factor is therefore called Wealth.
47
 
Comparing Table 3 and Table 4 EDUCATION SPENDING do no longer load on the Wealth 
factor in Table 4. The result of this has little to say for the theoretical identification of the 
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 Factor scores under 0.35 have been omitted from the tables; these scores are so low that they are not relevant 
for the understanding of the hypothetical variables made out of the loading of the different variables on the 
factor.  
46
 All together the four factors explain 0.733 of the variance to the variables in Table 3, and 0.709 in Table 4.  
47
 BUREAUCRATIQ QUALITY, is by Jakobsen, De Soysa, and Jakobsen (2013) found to be an indicator for 
Capacity. This factor is not found in this thesis.  
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factor, because it loads weakly compared to other clear opportunity variables. The same goes 
for POPULATION GROWTH that loads on the fourth factor in Table 3, but on the Wealth factor 
in Table 4. 
 
Table 3. Eigenvalue, rotated,variable loadings, unique variance, ETHFRACIPOLATED, 
1985– 2010 
Variables Wealth Empowerment Grievance Identity Uniqueness    
GDP per capita¤ 0.940    0.095 
Agriculture  -0.886      0.238 
Bureaucratic quality 0.881    0.220 
Life expectancy   0.820    0.171 
Rural population -0.813    0.289 
Law and order 0.720    0.366 
Educational spending  0.512   0.428 0.422 
Military  -0.825   0.361 
Fuel export  -0.805   0.391 
Polity  0.804   0.204 
Empowerment rights  0.751   0.205 
Population¤   -1.011  0.152 
Physical integrity rights   0.636  0.231 
EthfracIpolated    0.714 0.274 
Population growth    0.542 0.390 
Eigenvalue 5.974 2.314 1.346 1.000 N=1185 
 
Arguing that ethnic fractionalization is an indicator of opportunity for civil conflict onset, 
ethnic groups are seen extreme forms of interest groups that have a common preference in 
politics (Fearon 2006). Ethnic groups must be seen as rational actors that calculate and 
maximize the utility before taking part in or starting a civil conflict (Toft 2002). Following a 
rational actor perspective, ethnic collective violence is based on a belief that each individual 
within the ethnic group have given wants, goals, or tastes, and individuals will choose the 
most efficient way to reach their goals (Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum 1982). Further, 
ethnicity is an indicator of opportunity since the group must be of a certain size in order to 
rebel. This argument was based on findings presented by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005), and Ellingsen (2000). The regression analysis in Table 2 supports their findings due to 
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the significant effect of the curvilinear relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil 
conflict onset.  
 
As both Table 3 and Table 4 demonstrate ethnicity does not load in the Wealth factor. As a 
result of this hypothesis H2: Ethnicity is a mechanism of opportunity, must be rejected. 
ETHFRACWAR, the variable coded based on the curvilinear relationship between ethnic 
fractionalization and civil conflict onset strengthens the rejection of hypothesis H2 since some 
level of polarization is taken into account. Ethnic fractionalization is not a mechanism of 
opportunity and rational actor theory.  
 
Table 4. Eigenvalue, rotated, variable loading, and uniwue variance, ETHFRACWAR, 
1985– 2010 
Variables Wealth Empowerment Grievance Identity  Uniqueness      
GDP per capita¤ 0.927    0.096 
Agriculture  -0.950      0.225 
Bureaucratic quality 0.737    0.328 
Life expectancy   0.9334    0.203 
Rural population -0.896    0.280 
Law and order 0.617    0.401 
Educational spending    0.493  0.610 
Military  -0.828   0.360 
Fuel export  -0.811   0.391 
Polity  0.807   0.205 
Empowerment rights   0.755   0.207 
Population¤   -0.948  0.244 
Physical integrity rights   0.663  0.232 
Ethfracwar    0.985 0.027 
Population growth -0.517    0.558 
Eigenvalue 6.230 2.347 1.343 1.071 N=1185 
 
The second and third factors are both grievance factors, named respectively Empowerment 
rights, and Grievance. Factor number two is a grievance factor based on the theoretical 
argument that belonging to the variables MILITARY, POLITY, and EMPOWERMENT RIGHTS. 
The variable FUEL EXPORT was theoretically argued to be an indicator for opportunity, but 
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since all the other variables that load on the factor have a strong belonging in the grievance 
theory the factor is identified as a grievance factor. FUEL EXPORT can also be seen as a 
grievance indicator based on the theoretical argument. States will be unwilling to give up, or 
have an interest in stronger control over areas where there are valuable natural resources. Due 
to the states interest, and their willingness to get what they are interested in, a feeling of 
grievance may develop among those that are affected by the interests of the states. Finding 
natural resources such as oil, gas, diamonds, and gold can lead to a rearrangement or 
compulsory moving for those living in the area (Toft 2002). Based on this the level of fuel 
export might result in grievances among those that are affected. Further, countries might not 
have good governance, and the economic advantages might only benefit a share of the 
population. This in turn might lead to a relative deprivation or inequality (Davies 1962; Gurr 
1970, Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2009, 2010). The third factor Grievance has high 
loadings of variables that clearly are theoretical grievance variables. In Table 3 the factor is 
made up of POPULATION, and PHYSICAL INTEGRITY RIGHTS, in Table 4 EDUCATION 
SPENDING also loads on this factor. There are no changes in which factors that have the 
highest loading, and therefore the factor has the same name in both of the tables.  
 
Explaining civil war as a result of grievance has its roots in the relative deprivation theory. 
The deprived actor school assumes that anger is a result of deprivation, and that it has a direct 
effect on the likelihood of a person’s participation in violent action (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970). 
Frustration explanations for civil war onset is linked to ethnicity by arguing that grievance is 
based in ethnic identity, and that a common identity in itself is not sufficient in order to 
mobilize for civil war onset, a common grievance must also be present (Toft 2002; Murshed 
and Gates 2005). In light of the relative deprivation school the gap between what an 
individual expects, and what one gets results in grievances. If this is experienced along ethnic 
lines an ethnic group can gather, and fight collectively for what each of the individuals feel 
they are entitled to. Inequality between ethnic groups is also seen as something that can result 
in grievance within an ethnic group. Ethnic groups that are discriminated have a higher 
likelihood of turning violent than groups that are not politically discriminated (Cederman, 
Wimman and Min 2009, 2010). According to Sen (1973) there is a close link between 
inequality and rebellion. In their model for civil war Collier and Hoeffler (2004) used ethnic 
fractionalization as a mechanism of grievance, when they included it in their grievance model 
for civil war onset. The results from the factor analysis show that Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
where wrong when assuming that ethnicity is an indicator for grievance. Ethnicity does not 
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load on either of the grievance factors, Empowerment or Grievance. As a result of this it 
follows that hypothesis H1: Ethnicity is a mechanism of grievance, is rejected.  Linking 
together ethnicity and grievance is not the right way to go about when connecting ethnic 
fractionalization as and civil war onset.  
 
It is the fourth factor that gives an answer to what ethnic fractionalization is an indicator of. In 
Table 3 ETHFRACIPOLATED loads on factor four together with the variables EDUACATION 
SPENDING, and POPULATION GROWTH. It is ETHFRACIPOLATED that has the highest loading 
on the factor, and based on the theoretical explanation of ethnicity as an indicator of identity 
this factor is named Identity. In Table 4 it is only one variable that load on factor four, this is 
ETHFRACWAR which emphasize that the factor should be named Identity. 
 
Ethnic fractionalization is argued to be an indicator in itself for civil conflict onset based on 
the importance of ethnic identity. According to Wolff (2006) ethnic identity has an enormous 
power when it becomes the predominant identity in a person’s personality. As mentioned 
earlier, it is the fundamental factor that ethnicity rest upon that makes it so important for a 
person, these are factors such as language, religion, heritage and territory (Ellingsen 2000; 
Toft 2002). Based on Toft (2002), ethnic identity is an indicator in itself, this is because much 
of ethnic group identity rests upon the territory where they live. Territory is important for the 
survival of the group. If an ethnic group feel that their territory is threatened the salience of 
their shared identity becomes apparent, and the group must mobilize in order to protect their 
territory and secure their survival and identity (Toft 2002). According to primordialists, ethnic 
identity is enough to mobilize for civil conflict onset in itself, based on the fundamental 
characteristics of ethnicity, “ancient hatred” and differences between groups. They argue that 
there are no other mechanisms needed for civil war onset than common ethnic identity. Only 
identity can explain civil war onset, not for instance political and economic differences 
(Blimes 2006; Østby 2011). The result from the factor analysis in both Table 3, and Table 4 
give support to hypothesis H3: Ethnicity is an indicator for civil conflict in itself.   
 
By confirming hypothesis H3, that ethnicity is an indicator in itself the research question has 
been answered, ethnicity work as an indicator through the mechanism of identity in civil 
conflict onset.  The results from the factor analysis show that Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) are incorrect when they operationalize ethnic fractionalization as an 
indicator for grievance, nor is it an indicator of opportunity as indicated by Ellingsen (2011). 
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That ethnicity is not an indicator of grievance or opportunity has consequences for the 
conceptual understanding of civil conflict onset as a result of grievance or opportunity. Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004), and to some extent Fearon and Laitin (2003) conceptualize civil war as a 
result of grievance or opportunity, it follows based the results from the factor analysis that 
identity also must be built-in when modeling civil conflict onset.
48
 The result of this is that a 
new model for civil war onset must be put forward, civil conflict as a result of grievance, 
opportunity or identity, and not only grievance or opportunity as done by Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004), and Fearon and Laitin (2003).  
 
But is it as simple as to explain civil war as a result of grievance, opportunity, or identity? 
According to primordialists it is, but arguing that ethnic identity is a mechanism for civil war 
onset in itself has been critiqued by those who do not believe in the primordial explanation of 
the link between ethnicity and civil conflict onset. Primordialists fail to account for the 
differences in the level of conflict over time, and also why there are multiethnic societies that 
live in peace (Østby 2011). Following this criticism of primordialism, identity as a mechanism 
for civil war onset is not enough in itself to start a conflict.  
 
Despite arguing strongly for the link between of territory and ethnic identity, Toft (2002) also 
built upon grievance and opportunity. She argued that ethnic groups are rational actors that do 
a cost-benefit analysis before entering a civil war. This links together identity and opportunity 
as mechanisms for civil war onset. Further, if an ethnic groups territory is threatened, so are 
the chances for survival of an ethnic group, this leads to frustration and grievance. According 
to Murshed and Gates (2005: 122) it is not enough to have a common identity, there must also 
be a shared feeling of grievance. If a person identifies with a group that is victim of 
discrimination, the more likely it is that the individual will participate in violent actions in 
order to defend their ethnic identity. In this case a shared ethnic identity and grievance 
function as a mobilization factor (Harff and Gurr 1993). Based on this argument there are no 
clear distinction between whether it is identity or grievance or opportunity that causes civil 
war. The likelihood of civil conflict onset increases if there are a combination of mechanisms 
involved. In other words, grievance and opportunity can still be mechanisms for civil war 
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 As demonstrated in the regression analysis it is a significant relationship between ETHFRACIPOLATED and civil 
conflict onset. With civil war onset as the dependent variable no significant relationship to ETHFRACIPOLATED 
was found. As mentioned earlier this is in accordance to the findings done by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and 
Fearon and Laitin (2003). But reviewing the literature on civil war onset other scholars have found a significant 
relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil war (Sambanis 2001; Regan and Norton 2005), based on 
this the following argument can be applicable to civil war onset, as well as civil conflict. 
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onset, but ethnicity is not an indicator for either of them and must be conceptualized as a 
mechanism in itself.  
 
If civil war is operationalized in a perspective of either grievance or opportunity an important 
mechanism for civil war onset is left out, the mechanism of identity. This is shown in two 
factor analyses where ethnic fractionalization is identified to be an indicator in itself, due to 
the salience off identity for civil conflict onset. But identity is not a mechanism that in itself 
can explain civil war onset.  The arguments above show that it is problematic to frame civil 
conflict onset in “either-or” terms. This is supported by several scholars (Ellingsen 2000, 
2011; Gurr 2000; Berdal 2005; Østby 2008).  
 
In other words, recognizing the importance of identity when explaining civil war onset, 
cannot be the same as ruling out the importance of grievance and opportunity, these are still 
important mechanisms in order to clarify onset of civil conflict. Neither is the conceptual 
distinction for understanding civil conflict as a mechanism of grievance or opportunity 
helpful. Civil conflict cannot be understood through either opportunity or grievance as argued, 
and operationalized by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and in part by Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
In order to explain civil war the mechanism of identity must also be incorporated into the 
model, this is demonstrated through the results of the factor analyses where ethnicity is not an 
indicator of grievance as it operationalized by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and 
Laitin (2003), and neither an indicator of opportunity as indicated by Elingsen (2011). 
Ethnicity is an indicator in itself due to the salience of identity. The result are presented in 
Figure 3 where it is shown that ethnicity is an indicator of identity, and the arrows pointing 
from the different mechanisms demonstrate that civil war is a result of all three mechanisms, 
grievance, opportunity, and identity.  
 
Figure 4. Overview results and argument 
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Widening the conceptual understanding of civil war is confirmatory with Gurr (2000), and 
Ellingsen (2000) argument. Both argue that civil war onset cannot be seen as a result of 
identity, grievance or opportunity, rather it should be seen as a result of identity, grievance, 
and opportunity. According to Gurr (2000: 66) “It is simplistic to argue that one kind of 
motivation is primary and the others subsidiary”.  
 
All in all, based on the results from the factor analysis, it is concluded that ethnic identity is 
an indicator for civil conflict onset in itself due to the salience of identity. But legitimate 
critique of the primordial perspective on ethnicity and civil conflict, alongside an argument 
that civil war is a result of several mechanisms show that identity is not a sufficient 
mechanism in itself to explain civil war, grievance and opportunity must also be included in 
an explanation.  With ethnicity as an indicator for civil war onset in itself, further research 
cannot be conceptualized as a result of grievance or opportunity, as done by Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004). Identity must be included in a causal model for civil conflict onset, and civil 
conflict must be seen as a result of grievance, opportunity and identity, not grievance, 
opportunity or identity (Ellingsen 2000, 2011; Gurr 2000).  
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5 Conclusion  
In this thesis I have answered the research question, through what mechanism does ethnic 
fractionalization work as an indicator for civil conflict onset? In earlier literature there has 
been a tendency to operationalize ethnic fractionalization as a measure for grievance when 
explaining civil conflict onset, often in a perspective of conceptualizing civil conflict as a 
consequence of either grievance or opportunity (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 
2004; Ellingsen 2011). The main contribution of this thesis to the research field of civil war 
onset is to answer whether ethnicity can be operationalized as an indicator of grievance, or if 
it is an indicator of the mechanism opportunity, or a mechanism in itself due to the salience of 
ethnic identity.  
 
Based on the results from the analysis I have demonstrated that ethnic fractionalization is an 
indicator of civil conflict onset in itself, due to the salience of ethnic identity. This means that 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) are incorrect when using ethnic 
fractionalization as an indicator of grievance. As a consequence of the results it follows that 
further research must include identity in a causal model when conceptualizing civil conflict 
onset. Civil conflict cannot be conceptualized as a result of either grievance or opportunity as 
done by Collier and Hoeffler (2004). Following this, I argue that ethnic identity as a 
mechanism for civil war in itself due to the salience of identity, but that it is not adequate to 
start a civil war. This is mainly due to the primordialists’ failure to explain why not all ethnic 
groups fight each other, if the only mechanism needed for civil conflict inset is a shared ethnic 
identity. By this it follows that the mechanisms for civil conflict onset cannot be seen in an 
“either-or” perspective. Civil conflict must be seen as a result of grievance, opportunity and 
identity.  
 
Answering the research question is one of two contributions this thesis provides to the 
research of civil war onset. The second contribution is an updated version of the ELF-index. 
The ELF-index gives the level of ethnic fractionalization within a country by calculating the 
likelihood of two randomly drawn individuals in a country coming from different ethnic 
groups. By interpolating the old and new value in the ELF-index, the changing composition of 
ethnic fractionalization is reflected, which gave the variable ETHFRACIPOLATED. The second 
variable was also coded based on the relationship between ETHFRACIPOLATED, and civil 
conflict onset. Based on the curvilinear relationship between the two, the variable 
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ETHFRACWAR was coded so that it was pinpointed towards conflict. In order to test the new 
ELF-index and the empirical relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil conflict, a 
logistic regression analysis was performed, and presented in the chapter of empirical analyses. 
Using time-series cross-sectional data for the period 1985–2010, results showed a significant 
curvilinear relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil conflict onset, but not for 
civil war as dependent variable.  
 
Following this the hypotheses were tested. In order to do this, two separate exploratory factor 
analyses were performed, the difference between them being the coding of the variable 
measuring ethnic fractionalization. One included ETHFRACIPOLATED, the other one 
ETHFRACWAR, both gave the same results. In order to answer the research question I 
theorized three possible links between ethnicity and civil conflict onset earlier in the thesis. 
This resulted in three mutually exclusive hypotheses. The first hypothesis H1: Ethnicity is an 
indicator of grievance, was theorized based on the relationship between ethnicity, relative 
deprivation and inequality. The second hypothesis H2: Ethnicity is an indicator of 
opportunity, was mainly based on the connection between ethnicity, and the rational actor 
theory. Last, the third hypothesis H3: Ethnicity is an indicator for civil conflict in itself, here I 
argued based on primordialists view, and the important link between territory and ethnic 
survival and that identity in itself is enough for civil conflict onset.  
 
Based on the results from the factor analyses, hypothesis H3 was confirmed. Ethnicity is an 
indicator in itself, due to the salience of identity. This means that ethnic fractionalization 
cannot be used as an indicator for grievance as done by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), nor is at 
an opportunity indicator as indicated by Ellingsen (2011). By concluding that ethnic 
fractionalization is an indicator for civil conflict onset in itself, it follows that future research 
must take into account the aspect of ethnicity when conceptualizing civil conflict onset. This 
results in another implication for future research. Since identity in itself cannot explain civil 
conflict onset, due to the shortcomings of the primordialists’ connection between ethnicity 
and civil conflict, civil conflict cannot be seen as a result of either grievance, frustration or 
identity, it must be seen as a result of all three. Civil conflict must be regarded as a result of 
grievance, opportunity and identity, in other words “It is simplistic to argue that one kind of 
motivation is primary and the others subsidiary” Gurr (2000: 66). 
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Appendix A 
 
Tables excluded from the analysis section 
 
Table A1. Binary regression, coefficient (st.error), civil conflict onset 
Variables 
EthfracIpolated 4.695*** 
(1.623) 
EthfracIpolated
2 
-3.003* 
(1.592) 
Lagged Incidence 0.879*** 
(0.313) 
Constant -4.985*** 
(0.378) 
N=4263  
Note: ***significant at 1%, **significant at 
5%, and *significant at 10%. The units are 
clustered by country using Huber-White 
robust standard errors (White, 1980). 
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Table A2. Logitsic Regression, coefficient (st.error), civil conflict/war, lag incidence 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Variables 
Model 1 
Conflict 
 
Model 2 
Conflict 
Model 4 
War 
Model 5 
War 
Population¤ 0.315*** 
(0.114) 
0.369*** 
(0.108) 
0.105 
(0.139) 
0.130 
(0.155) 
GDP per capita¤ -0.370*** 
(0.143) 
-0.462*** 
(0.148) 
-0.681*** 
(0.216) 
-0.731*** 
(0.206) 
Fuel exporter 0.857** 
(0.343) 
0.876*** 
(0.335) 
0.816 
(0.617) 
0.828 
(0.615) 
Mountain 0.005 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.015 
(0.010) 
Authocracya -0.037 
(0.324) 
0.312 
(0.318) 
-0.613 
(0.493) 
-0.605 
(0.499) 
Democracya 0.609 
(0.408) 
0.551 
(0.373) 
-1.127* 
(0.839) 
-1.440* 
(0.832) 
Empowerment rights -0.060 
(0.037) 
-0.059 
(0.037) 
-0.082 
(0.072) 
-0.085 
(0.070) 
EthfracIpolated 1.396*** 
(0.497) 
8.372*** 
(2.402) 
-0.180 
(0.879) 
2.322 
(4.590) 
EthfracIpolated
2   
 
-7.277*** 
(2.349) 
 -2.756 
(5.144) 
Temporal dependence     
Lag Incidence 0.382 
(0.322) 
0.248 
(0.321) 
-1.218 
(1.155) 
-1.260 
(1.143) 
Constant -6.923*** 
(2.161) 
-8.315*** 
(2.137) 
-0.951 
(3.386) 
-1.340 
(3.651) 
     
Pesudo LL -331.504 -326.648 -140.699 -140.407 
Observations 2734 2734 2754 2754 
Years 1985-2010 1985-2010 1985-2010 1985-2010 
Note:Lagged one year, ¤Log transformed, a Anocracy as reference category,  
b 
Probability of F-value, *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, and ***significant at 
1%. The units are clustered by country using Huber-White robust standard errors  
(White, 1980). 
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Appendix B 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table B1. Frequences, civil conflict onset 
Onset Frequency Percent 
0 4,141 96.62 
1 145 3.38 
Total 4,286 100 
 
Table B2. Frequences civil war onset 
Onset Frequency Percent 
0 4,2417 98.81 
1 51 1.19 
Total 4,298 100 
 
 
Table B3. Frequences dumy variable based on POLITY2 
Categories Frequency Percent 
Autocracy 1,097 27.96 
Anocracy (ref) 1,192 30.38 
Democracy 1,634 41.65 
Total 3,923 100 
 
Table B4. Frequences dummy variable fuel export 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Categories Frequency Percent 
0 (<1/3)* 3,086 83.02  
1 (>1/3)* 631 16.98  
Total 3,717 100  
*of total merchandise export 
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Table B5. Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
GDP per capita¤ 4122 4.164 11.627 7.677 1.619 
Agriculture 3767 0.035 96.577 17.557 15.529 
Bureaucratic quality 3314 0 4 2.148 1.183 
Life expectancy 4271 26.819 82.933 65.535 10.816 
Rural population 4276 0 94.943 47.568 23.596 
Law and order 3314 0 6 3.682 1.492 
Educational spending 2052 0 16.059 4.519 1.836 
Military 3112 0.046 117.388 2.693 3.504 
Polity 3923 -10 10 2.210 7.052 
Empowerment rights 3905 0 14 8.238 4.248 
Population¤ 4276 12.021 21.014 15.871 1.679 
Pgysical integrity rights 3915 0 8 4.800 2.297 
Ethfracipolated 4292 0.001 0.960 0.431 0.261 
Ethfracwar 4266 0.14 89 0.732 2.385 
Population growth 4274 -7.533 18.588 1.670 1.538 
Moutn 3682 0 94.3 17.485 21.837 
Note: ¤ Log transformed 
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Appendix C 
 
Graphs, figures, and explanations  
 
Figure C1. Screeplot, Table 3 
 
 
Figure C2. Screeplot, Table 4 
 
 
C3. Natural Cubic Splines 
The reason for using for using a natural cubic spline with three knots to control for temporal 
dependence is that there is no theoretical reason for assuming that there is a linear impact of 
time on the probability of conflict. The same assumption is done for the PEACE YEARS 
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variable included in the analysis, and why I chose to a natural cubic spline with three knots in 
the thesis, only including the regression analysis with lagged incidence variable in the 
appendix as a robust check. Natural cubic spines fit cubic polynomials to a predetermined 
number of subintervals of variable. These polynomials are joined as “knots,” and the number 
and placement of the knots specified by the analyst. Forcing the splines, and their first and 
second derivatives, to agree at each of the knots, enforces smoothness. Each knot only uses up 
one degree of freedom, so that we can flexibly fit a cubic spline using up only a very few 
degrees of freedom. The estimated spline coefficients can then be applied to trace out the path 
of duration dependence (Beck et al. 1998: 1270). 
